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Savages, Victims, and Saviors:
The Metaphor of Human Rights
Makau Mutua*
I. INTRODUCTION
The human rights movement 1 is marked by a damning metaphor. The
grand narrative of human rights contains a subtext that depicts an epochal
contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the
other.2 The savages-victims-saviors (SVS)3 construction is a three-dimension-
* Professor of Law and Director, Human Rights Center, State University of New York at Buffalo
School of Law. SJ.D., Harvard Law School, 1987; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1985; LL.M., University
of Dar-es-salaam, 1984; LL.B., University of Dar-es-salaam, 1983; Co-Chair, 2000 Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law. In March 1999, an early draft of this Article was presented at the
Faculty Workshop Series at Harvard Law School. In November 1999, a later version was presented at
Yale Law School under the auspices of the Orville Schell Center for International Human Rights. I am
greatly indebted to the participants at both fora for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to the
following colleagues who enriched this Article with their insightful conversations: William Alford,
Guyora Binder, Christine Desan, Gerald Frug, Mary Ann Glendon, Paul Kahn, Duncan Kennedy, Ran-
dall Kennedy, Martha Minow, Spencer Overton, Richard Parker, Peter Rosenblum, James Silk, Joel
Singer, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Lucie White, and David Wilkins. I wish especially to thank Leila Hilal,
David Kennedy, Frank Michelman, and Henry Steiner for closely reading a draft of this Article and
making critically significant and vital comments and suggestions.
I. For the purposes of this Article, the "human rights movement" refers to that collection of norms,
processes, and institutions that traces its immediate ancestry to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
The UDHR, the first human rights document adopted by the United Nations, is the textual foundation
of the human rights movement and has been referred to as the "spiritual parent" of most other human
rights documents. Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTs. YB. 77,
79 (1988). Elsewhere, Steiner and Philip Alston call the UDHR "the parent document, the initial burst
of idealism and enthusiasm, terser, more general and grander than the treaties, in some sense the consti-
tution of the entire movement ... the single most invoked human rights instrument." HENRY J. STEI-
NER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 120
(1996).
2. This oppositional duality is central to the logic of Western philosophy and modernity. As described
by David Slater, this binary logic constructs historical imperatives of the superior and the inferior, the
barbarian and the civilized, and the traditional and the modern. Within this logic, history is a linear, uni-
directional progression with the superior and scientific Western civilization leading and paving the way
for others to follow. See generally David Slater, Contesting Occidental Visions of the Global: The Geopolitics of
Theory and North-South Relations, BEYOND LAw, Dec. 1994, at 97, 100-01.
3. This Article hereinafter refers to the "savages-victims-saviors" metaphor as "SVS." The author uses
the term "metaphor" to suggest a historical figurative analogy within human rights and its rhetoric and
discourse.
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al compound metaphor in which each dimension is a metaphor in itself.4
The main authors of the human rights discourse,5 including the United Na-
tions, Western states, international non-governmental organizations (IN-
GOs),6 and senior Western academics, constructed this three-dimensional
prism. This rendering of the human rights corpus and its discourse is uni-
directional and predictable, a black-and-white construction that pits good
against evil.
This Article attempts to elicit from the proponents of the human rights
movement several admissions, some of them deeply unsettling. It asks that
human rights advocates be more self-critical and come to terms with the
troubling rhetoric and history that shape, in part, the human rights move-
ment. At the same time, the Article does not only address the biased and
arrogant rhetoric and history of the human rights enterprise, but also grap-
ples with the contradictions in the basic nobility and majesty that drive the
human rights project-the drive from the unflinching belief that human
beings and the political societies they construct can be governed by a higher
morality. This first section briefly introduces the three dimensions of the
SVS metaphor and how the metaphor exposes the theoretical flaws of the
current human rights corpus.
The first dimension of the prism depicts a savage and evokes images of
barbarism. The abominations of the savage are presented as so cruel and
unimaginable as to represent their state as a negation of humanity. The hu-
man rights story presents the state as the classic savage, an ogre forever bent
on the consumption of humans.7 Although savagery in human rights dis-
course connotes much more than the state, the state is depicted as the opera-
tional instrument of savagery. States become savage when they choke off and
4. Each of the three elements of the SVS compound metaphor can operate as independent, stand-alone
metaphors as well. Each of these three separate metaphors is combined within the grand narrative of
human rights to compose the compound metaphor.
5. I have elsewhere grouped the major authors of human rights as belonging to four dominant schools:
conventional doctrinalists, who are mostly, though not exclusively, human rights activists; conceptualiz-
ers, mostly senior Western academics who systematize human rights discourse; multiculturalists or plu-
ralists, who are mainly non-Western; and instrumentalists or political strategists, who are Western states
and Western dominated inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and the World
Bank. See generally Makau wa Murna, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 594-601
(1996).
6. Human rights international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are typically "First World"
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that concentrate on human rights monitoring of, reporting on,
and advocacy in "Third World" scates. These INGOs share a fundamental commitment to the proselyti-
zation of Western liberal values, particularly expressive and political participation rights. See HENRY J.
STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS: NON-GO VERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVI3-
MENT 19 (1991). For a further explanation of the term "Third World," see infra note 23.
7. The human rights corpus is ostensibly meant to contain the state, for the state is apparently the
raison d'itre for the corpus. See Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104 HARv. L. REv. 917, 928-33
(1991) (reviewing Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990)). Thus the state is depicted as the "an-
tithesis of human rights; the one exists to combat the other in a struggle for supremacy over society."
Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despairfor a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARv. HuM.
RTS. J. 63, 67 (1997).
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oust civil society.8 The "good" state controls its demonic proclivities by
cleansing itself with, and internalizing, human rights. The "evil" state, on
the other hand, expresses itself through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or
other authoritarian culture. The redemption or salvation of the state is solely
dependent on its submission to human rights norms. The state is the guar-
antor of human rights; it is also the target and raison d'etre of human rights
law.9
But the reality is far more complex. While the metaphor may suggest
otherwise, it is not the state per se that is barbaric but the cultural founda-
tion of the state. The state only becomes a vampire when "bad" culture over-
comes or disallows the development of "good" culture. The real savage,
though, is not the state but a cultural deviation from human rights. That
savagery inheres in the theory and practice of the one-party state, military
junta, controlled or closed state, theocracy, or even cultural practices such as
the one popularly known in the West as female genital mutilation (FGM),10
not in the state per se. The state itself is a neutral, passive instrumentality-
a receptacle or an empty vessel-that conveys savagery by implementing the
project of the savage culture.
The second dimension of the prism depicts the face and the fact of a vic-
tim as well as the essence and the idea of victimhood. A human being whose
"dignity and worth" have been violated by the savage is the victim. The vic-
tim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent whose naturalist attributes have
been negated by the primitive and offensive actions of the state or the cul-
tural foundation of the state. The entire human rights structure is both anti-
catastrophic and reconstructive. It is anti-catastrophic because it is designed
to prevent more calamities through the creation of more victims. It is recon-
structive because it seeks to re-engineer the state and the society to reduce
the number of victims, as it defines them,11 and prevent conditions that give
8. In Western thought and philosophy, the state becomes savage if it suffocates or defies civil society.
See generally John Keane, Despotism and Democracy, in Civa. SociETY AND THE STATE 35 (John Keane ed.,
1988).
9. Mutua, Hope and Despairfor a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, supra note 7, at 67.
10. There has been considerable debate among scholars, activists, and others in Africa and in the West
about the proper term for this practice entailing the surgical modification or the removal of some por-
tions of the female genitalia. For a survey of the debate, see Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital
Mutilation" : Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 4-8 (1995);
Hope Lewis & Isabelle R. Gunning, Cleaning Our Own Houe: "Exotic" and Familial Human Rights Viola-
tions, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123, 123-24 n.2 (1998). See also Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Percep-
tion, World Traveling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 189, 193 n.5 (1991-92).
11. The human rights movement recognizes only a particular type of victim. The term "victim" is not
deployed popularly or globally but refers rather to individuals who have suffered specific abuses arising
from the stare's transgression of internationally recognized human rights. For example, the human rights
movement regards an individual subjected to torture by a state as a victim whereas a person who dies of
starvation due to famine or suffers malnutrition for lack of a balanced diet is not regarded as a human
rights victim. The narrow definition of the victim in these instances relates in part to the secondary status
of economic and social rights in the jurisprudence of human rights. See generally U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess.,
Supp 2, at 82, U.N. Doc. E/1993/22 (1992) (criticizing the emphasis placed upon civil and political
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rise to victims. The classic human rights document-the human rights re-
port--embodies these two mutually reinforcing strategies. An INGO hu-
man rights report is usually a catalogue of horrible catastrophes visited on
individuals. As a rule, each report also carries a diagnostic epilogue and rec-
ommended therapies and remedies. 12
The third dimension of the prism is the savior or the redeemer, the good
angel who protects, vindicates, civilizes, restrains, and safeguards. The savior
is the victim's bulwark against tyranny. The simple, yet complex promise of
the savior is freedom: freedom from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and
culture. But it is also the freedom to create a better society based on par-
ticular values. In the human rights story, the savior is the human rights cor-
pus itself, with the United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and
Western charities as the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world. 13 In
reality, however, these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is ultimately
a set of culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought
and philosophy.
The human rights corpus, though well-meaning, is fundamentally Euro-
centric,' 4 and suffers from several basic and interdependent flaws captured in
the SVS metaphor. First, the corpus falls within the historical continuum of
the Eurocentric colonial project, in which actors are cast into superior and
subordinate positions. Precisely because of this cultural and historical con-
text, the human rights movement's basic claim of universality is under-
rights over economic, social, and cultural rights).
12. The art and science of human rights reporting was pioneered and perfected by Amnesty Interna-
tional (AI), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and Human Rights Watch (HRW), the three
oldest and most influential INGOs. Other INGOs as well as domestic human rights groups have nim-
icked this reporting. On the character, work, and mandate of NGOs and INGOs, see generally Nigel
Rodley, The Work of Non-Governmental Organizations in the World-Wide Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, 90/1 U.N. BULL. HUM. RTs. 84, 85 (1991), excerpted in STEINER & ALLSTON, supra note 1, at
476-79; Peter R. Baehr, Amnesty International and Its Self-Imposed Limited Mandate, 12 NETH. Q. Hum.
RTs. 5 (1994); Jerome Shestack, Sisyphus Endures: The International Human Rights NGO, 24 N.Y.L. SH. L.
REv. 89 (1978-79); Theo van Boven, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in International Human
Rights Standard-Setting: A Prerequisite of Democracy, 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 207 (1989-90).
13. Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of HRW, underscored the savior metaphor when he pow-
erfully defended the human rights movement against attacks that it had failed to move the international
community to stop the 1994 mass killings in Rwanda. He dismissed those attacks as misguided, arguing
that they amounted to a call to close "the fire brigade because a building burned down, even if it was a
big building." Kenneth Roth, Letter to the Editor, Human-rights abuses in Rwanda, TIMES LITERARY
SUPP., Mar. 14, 1997, at 15. Turning to various countries in Africa as examples, he pointed to the grati-
tude of Africans, who with the help of the human rights movement, threw off dictatorial regimes and
inaugurated political freedom. Id. He argued, further, that in some countries, "like Nigeria, Kenya,
Liberia, Zambia, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo], the human-rights movement has
helped numerous Africans avoid arbitrary detention, violent abuse and other violations." Id.
14. This Article contends that the participation of non-European states and societies in the enforce-
ment of human rights cannot in itself universalize those rights. It is important to note that the terms
"European" or "Eurocentric" are used descriptively and do not necessarily connote evil or undesirability.
They do, however, point to notions of cultural specificity and historical exclusivity. The simple point is
that Eurocentric norms and cultures, such as human rights, have either been imposed on, or assimilated
by, non-European societies. Thus the current human rights discourse is an important currency of cross-
cultural exchange, domination, and valuation.
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mined. Instead, a historical understanding of the struggle for human dignity
should locate the impetus of a universal conception of human rights in those
societies subjected to European tyranny and imperialism. Unfortunately, this
is not part of the official human rights narrative. Some of the most impor-
tant events preceding the post-1945, United Nations-led human rights
movement include the anti-slavery campaigns in both Africa and the United
States, the anti-colonial struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and
the struggles for women's suffrage and equal rights throughout the world. 15
But the pioneering work of many non-Western activists16 and other human
rights heroes are not acknowledged by the contemporary human rights
movement. These historically important struggles, together with the norms
anchored in non-Western cultures and societies, have either been overlooked
or rejected in the construction of the current understanding of human
rights.
Second, the SVS metaphor and narrative rejects the cross-contamination 17
of cultures and instead promotes a Eurocentric ideal. The metaphor is
premised on the transformation by Western cultures of non-Western cul-
tures into a Eurocentric prototype and not the fashioning of a multicultural
mosaic."' The SVS metaphor results in an "othering" process that imagines
the creation of inferior clones, in effect dumb copies of the original. For ex-
ample, Western political democracy is in effect an organic element of human
rights.1 9 "Savage" cultures and peoples are seen as lying outside the human
rights orbit, and by implication, outside the regime of political democracy.
It is this distance from human rights that allows certain cultures to create
victims. Political democracy is then viewed as a panacea. Other textual ex-
amples anchored in the treatment of cultural phenomena, such as "tradi-
tional" practices that appear to negate the equal protection for women, also
illustrate the gulf between human rights and non-liberal, non-European
cultures.
15 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, AcTIVISTs BEYOND BORDERS: ADvOCACY NET-
WORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 39-58 (1998).
16. See, eog., JOSIAH MWANGI KARIUKI, "MAU MAU" DETAINEE: THE ACCOUNT BY A KENYAN AFRI-
CAN OF HIS EXPERIENCES IN DETENTION CAMPS, 1953-1960 (1963); KWAME NKRuMAH, AUTOBIOG-
RAPHY OF KwAME NKRUMAH (1973); MOHANDAS K. GHANDI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF
MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH (1957).
17. The author uses the term "cross-contamination" facetiously here to refer to the idea of "cross-
fertilization." Many Western human rights actors see the process of multiculturalization in human rights
as contaminating as opposed to cross-fertilizing in an enriching way. For example, Louis Henkin has
accused those who advocate cultural pluralism or diversity of seeking to make human rights vague and
ambiguous. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, at x (1990). In other words, he casts cross-fertilization
as a negative process, one that is contaminating and harmful to the clarity of human rights.
18. Slater argues that the "Western will to expand was rooted in the desire to colonize, civilize and
possess the non-Western society; to convert what was different and enframed as inferior and backward
into a subordinated same." Slater, supra note 2, at 101.
19. For a discussion on the relationship among human rights, political democracy, and constitution-
alism, see STEINER & .ALSTON, supra note 1, at 710-25.
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Third, the language and rhetoric of the human rights corpus present
significant theoretical problems. The arrogant and biased rhetoric of the
human rights movement prevents the movement from gaining cross-cultural
legitimacy.20 This curse of the SVS rhetoric has no bearing on the substance
of the normative judgment being rendered. A particular leader, for example,
could be labeled a war criminal, but such a label may carry no validity lo-
cally because of the curse of the SVS rhetoric.21 In other words, the SVS
rhetoric may undermine the universalist warrant that it claims and thus en-
gender resistance to the apprehension and punishment of real violators.
The subtext of human rights is a grand narrative hidden in the seemingly
neutral and universal language of the corpus. For example, the U.N. Charter
describes its mandate to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small." 22 This is certainly a noble ideal. But
what exactly does that terminology mean here? This phraseology conceals
more than it reveals. What, for example, are fundamental human rights, and
how are they determined? Do such rights have cultural, religious, ethical,
moral, political, or other biases? What exactly is meant by the "dignity and
worth" of the human person? Is there an essentialized human being that the
corpus imagines? Is the individual found in the streets of Nairobi, the slums
of Boston, the deserts of Iraq, or the rainforests of Brazil? In addition to the
Herculean task of defining the prototypical human being, the U.N. Charter
puts forward another pretense-that all nations "large and small" enjoy
some equality. Even as it ratified power imbalances between the Third
World23 and the dominant American and European powers, the United Na-
tions gave the latter the primary power to define and determine "world
peace" and "stability."24 These fictions of neutrality and universality, like so
much else in a lopsided world, undergird the human rights corpus and belie
its true identity and purposes. This international rhetoric of goodwill re-
20. Since the rhetoric is flawed, those who create and promote it wonder whether it will resonate "out
there" in the Third World. The use of the SVS rhetoric is in itself insulting and unjust because it draws
from supremacist First World/Third World hierarchies and the attendant domination and subordination
which are essential for those constructions.
21. For example, Serbs sympathized with former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milogevi6 possibly be-
cause they felt he had been stigmatized by the West. Milogevk played to locals' fears of the West and
used the arrogance of the discourse to blunt the fact hat he is an indicted war criminal. See e.g,, Niles
Lathem, Defiant M'lotevi. Hell, No, I won't go!, N.Y. POST, Aug. 7, 1999, at 10.
22. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
23. The term "Third World" here refers to a geographic, political, historical, developmental, and ra-
cial paradigm. It is a term that is commonly used to refer to non-European, largely non-industrial, capi-
tal-importing countries, most of which were colonial possessions of European powers. As a political force,
the Third World traces its origins to the Bandung Conference of 1955 in which the first independent
African and Asian states sought to launch a political movement to counter Western hegemony over
global affairs. See ROBERT- MORTIMER, THE THIRD WORLD COALITION IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS (1984). See
also Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, in PROC. 94TH ANN. MEETING-AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. (forthcoming
2001).
24. Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and the Incom-
mensurability of Difference, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 337, 339-40 (1996).
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veals, just beneath the surface, intentions and reality that stand in great ten-
sion and contradiction with it.
This Article is not merely about the language of human rights or the
manner in which the human rights movement describes its goals, subjects,
and intended outcomes. It is not a plea for the human rights movement to
be more sensitive to non-Western cultures. Nor is it a wholesale rejection of
the idea of human rights.25 Instead, the Article is fundamentally an attempt
at locating-philosophically, culturally, and historically-the normative
edifice of the human rights corpus. If the human rights movement is driven
by a totalitarian or totalizing impulse, that is, the mission to require that all
human societies transform themselves to fit a particular blueprint, then
there is an acute shortage of deep reflection and a troubling abundance of
zealotry in the human rights community. This vision of the "good society"
must be vigorously questioned and contested.
Fourth, the issue of power is largely ignored in the human rights corpus.
There is an urgent need for a human rights movement that is multicultural,
inclusive, and deeply political. Thus, while it is essential that a new human
rights movement overcome Eurocentrism, it is equally important that it also
address deeply lopsided power relations among and within cultures, national
economies, states, genders, religions, races and ethnic groups, and other so-
cietal cleavages. Such a movement cannot treat Eurocentrism as the starting
point and other cultures as peripheral. The point of departure for the move-
ment must be a basic assumption about the moral equivalency of all cul-
tures. Francis Deng has correctly pointed out that to "arrogate the concept
[of human rights] to only certain groups, cultures, or civilizations is to ag-
gravate divisiveness on the issue, to encourage defensiveness or unwarranted
self-justification on the part of the excluded, and to impede progress toward
a universal consensus on human rights."26
The fifth flaw concerns the role of race in the development of the human
rights narrative. The SVS metaphor of human rights carries racial connota-
tions in which the international hierarchy of race and color is reintrenched
and revitalized. The metaphor is in fact necessary for the continuation of the
global racial hierarchy. In the human rights narrative, savages and victims
are generally non-white and non-Western, while the saviors are white. This
old truism has found new life in the metaphor of human rights. But there is
also a sense in which human rights can be seen as a project for the redemp-
25 I have argued elsewhere that all human cultures have norms and practices that both violate and
protect human rights. Fundamental to this idea is the notion that all cultures construct their view of
human dignity. What is needed is not the imposition of a single culture's template of human dignity but
rather the mining of all cultures to craft a truly universal human rights corpus. See generally Makau wa
Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995).
26. Francis M. Deng, A Cultural Approach to Human Rights Among the Dinka, in HuMN RIGHTS IN
AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 261, 261 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds.,
1990).
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tion of the redeemers, in which whites who are privileged globally as a peo-
ple-who have historically visited untold suffering and savage atrocities
against non-whites-redeem themselves by "defending" and "civilizing"
"lower," "unfortunate," and "inferior" peoples. The metaphor is thus laced
with the pathology of self-redemption.
As currently constituted and deployed, the human rights movement will
ultimately fail because it is perceived as an alien ideology in non-Western
societies. The movement does not deeply resonate in the cultural fabrics of
non-Wester states, except among hypocritical elites steeped in Western
ideas. In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be
moored in the cultures of all peoples.27
The project of reconsidering rights, with claims to their supremacy, is not
new. The culture of rights in the present milieu stretches back at least to the
rise of the modern state in Europe. It is that state's monopoly of violence and
the instruments of coercion that gave rise to the culture of rights to coun-
terbalance the abusive state.28 Robert Cover refers to this construction as the
myth of the jurisprudence of rights that allows society to both legitimize
and control the state.29 Human rights, however, renew the meaning and
scope of rights in a radical way. Human rights bestow naturalness, transhis-
toricity, and universality to rights. But this Article lodges a counterclaim
against such a leap. This Article is certainly informed by the works of criti-
cal legal scholars,30 feminist critics of rights discourse,31 and critical race
theorists. 32 Still, the approach of this Article differs from all three because it
27. But genuine reconstructionisrs must not be mistaken with cynical cultural manipulators who will
stop at nothing to justify repressive rule and inhuman practices in the name of culture. Yash Ghai pow-
erfully exposed the distortions by several states of Asian conceptions of community, religion, and culture
to justify the use of coercive state apparatuses to crush dissent, protect particular models of economic
development, and retain political power within the hands of a narrow, largely unaccountable political and
bureaucratic elite. Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asia Debate, 15 AusTL. YB. INT'L L. 1
(1994).
Such cultural demagoguery is clearly as unacceptable as is the insistence by some Western academics
and leaders of the human rights movement that the non-West has nothing to contribute to the human
rights corpus and should accept the human rights corpus as a gift of civilization from the West. Sce Aryeh
Neier, Asia's Unacceptable Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 42 (1993). Henkin has written that the United
States viewed human rights "as designed to improve the condition of human rights in countries other
than the United States (and a very few like-minded liberal states)." HENKIN, supra note 17, at 74. Else-
where, Henkin has charged advocates of multiculturalism and ideological diversity in the reconstruction
of human rights with desiring a vague, broad, ambiguous, and general text of human rights, one that
would be easily manipulated by regimes and cultures bent on violating human rights. Id. at x.
28. See Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION 65
(1987).
29. Id. at 69. See also JOHN LOcKE, Two 'ThEAnsEs OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
30. For examples of critical legal scholarship, see generally Karl E. Klare, The Publc/Private Distinction
in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358 (1982); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363
(1984).
31. For examples of feminist critiques of the law, see generally Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Fed-
nist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REv. 387 (1984); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights
andPolitics: Perspectives From the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
32. For examples of critical race theory scholarship, see generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
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seeks to address an international phenomenon and not a municipal, dis-
tinctly American question. The critique of human rights should be based
not just on American or European legal traditions but also on other cultural
milieus. The indigenous, non-European traditions of Asia, Africa, the
Pacific, and the Americas must be central to this critique. The idea of hu-
man rights-the quest to craft a universal bundle of attributes with which
all societies must endow all human beings-is a noble one. The problem
with the current bundle of attributes lies in their inadequacy, incomplete-
ness, and wrong-headedness. There is little doubt that there is much to cele-
brate in the present human rights corpus just as there is much to quarrel
with. In this exercise, a sober evaluation of the current human rights corpus
and its language is not an option-it is required. 33
The Article continues to build on this theoretical background. Part II re-
lates human rights to the emergence of European and American senses of
global predestination and the mission to civilize by universalizing Eurocen-
tric norms. Part III focuses on the metaphor of the savage and looks at hu-
man rights norms, work, and scholarship to underscore the theme of the
Article. Parts IV and V use the same methodology and approach to explain
the victim and the savior metaphors, respectively. Part VI concludes by con-
tending that since an international discourse on human dignity is desirable
and inevitable, it is imperative that the grand metaphor be abandoned and
the mask of the false consensus lifted so that a new genuine consensus can be
constructed.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND NARRATIVE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Charter of the United Nations, which is the constitutional basis for
all U.N. human rights texts, captures the before-and-after, backward-
progressive view of history. It declares human rights an indispensable ele-
ment for the survival of humankind. It does so by undertaking as one of its
principal aims the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion." 34 This self-representation of human rights
requires moral and historical certainty and a belief in particular inflexible
truths. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the grandest
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Kimberl6 Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchmnent: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1331 (1988). For examples of critical race feminism, an offshoot of critical race theory, see
generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997); Leila Hilal, What is
Critical Race Feminism?, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 367 (1997) (reviewing CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A
READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997)).
33. For other probing critiques of the human rights movement, see Raimundo Panikkar, Is the Notion
of Human Rights a Western Concept?, 120 DIOGENES 75 (1982); Bilahari Kausikan, Asia's Different Stan-
dard, 92 FOREIGN POL'Y 24 (1993); Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An
African Pespective, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 309 (1987).
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c). See also id. pmbl.
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of all human rights documents, endows the struggle between good and evil
with historicity in which the defeat of the latter is only possible through
human rights.35 This is now popularly accepted as the normal script of hu-
man rights.36 In fact, there is today an orgy of celebration of this script by
prominent scholars who see in it the key to the redemption of humanity.37
But this grand script of human rights raises a multitude of normative and
cultural questions and problems, especially in light of the historical roots of
the human rights movement.
Any valid critique must first acknowledge that the human rights move-
ment, like earlier crusades, is a bundle of contradictions. It does not have,
therefore, a monopoly on virtue that its most vociferous advocates claim.
This Article argues that human rights, and the relentless campaign to uni-
versalize them, present a historical continuum in an unbroken chain of
Western conceptual and cultural dominance over the past several centuries.
At the heart of this continuum is a seemingly incurable virus: the impulse to
universalize Eurocentric norms and values by repudiating, demonizing, and
"othering" that which is different and non-European. By this argument, the
Article does not mean to suggest that human rights are bad per se or that
the human rights corpus is irredeemable. Rather, it suggests that the glob-
alization of human rights fits a historical pattern in which all high morality
comes from the West as a civilizing agent against lower forms of civilization
in the rest of the world. 38
Although the human rights movement is located within the historical
continuum of Eurocentrism as a civilizing mission, and therefore as an at-
tack on non-European cultures, it is critical to note that it was European,
and not non-European, atrocities that gave rise to it. While the movement
has today constructed the savage and the victim as non-European, Adolf
Hitler was the quintessential savage. The abominations and demise of his
regime ignited the human rights movement.39 Hitler, a white European, was
35. The UDHR argues in its preamble that it is the "disregard and contempt for human rights that
have resulted in barbarous acts" and that human dignity, freedom, justice, and peace can only be achieved
if human rights are respected. See UDHR, supra note 1, pmbl.
36. As noted by Mary Ann Glendon, the UDHR "is already showing signs of having achieved the
status of holy writ within the human rights movement." Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, 73 NoTRE DAME L. Ruv. 1153, 1153 (1998). Glendon also notes that "[clults
have formed around selected provisions [of the UDHR]." Id.
37. Henkin has called this the "Age of Rights" and asserted, unequivocally, that "[h]uman rights is
the idea of our time, the only political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance." HENKIN, supra
note 17, at xvii. Alston has argued that the naming of a claim "as a human right elevates it above the
rank and file of competing societal goals" and provides it with "an aura of timelessness, absoluteness and
universal validity." Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development,
1 HARv. Hum. RTs. YB. 3, 3 (1988). See also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Gov-
ernance, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (arguing not only for the universality of rights but also, to achieve
human rights goals, that human rights law requires a Western-style democratic government).
38. I have argued elsewhere that although the human rights corpus is essentially Eurocentric norma-
tively and culturally, it might be redeemed through the process of genuine multiculturalization. See
generally Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, supra note 5.
39. As noted by Thomas Buergenthal, the rise and development of the human rights movement "can
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the personification of evil. The Nazi regime, a white European government,
was the embodiment of barbarism. The combination of Hitler's gross devia-
tion from the evolving European constitutional law precepts and the en-
tombment of his imperial designs by the West and the Soviet Union started
the avalanche of norms known as the human rights corpus.
Nuremberg, the German town where some twenty-two major Nazi war
criminals were tried-resulting in nineteen convictions-stands as the
birthplace of the human rights movement, with the London Agreement ° its
birth certificate. Originally, the West did not create the human rights
movement in order to save or civilize non-Europeans, although these hu-
manist impulses drove the anti-slavery abolitionist efforts of the nineteenth
century.41 Neither the enslavement of Africans, with its barbaric conse-
quences and genocidal dimensions, nor the classic colonization of Asians,
Africans, and Latin Americans by Europeans, with its bone-chilling atroci-
ties, were sufficient to move the West to create the human rights movement.
It took the genocidal extermination of Jews in Europe-a white people-to
start the process of the codification and universalization of human rights
norms. Thus, although the Nuremberg Tribunal 42 has been argued by some
to be in a sense hypocritical, 43 it is its promise that is significant. For the
first time, the major powers drew a line demarcating impermissible conduct
by states towards their own people and created the concept of collective re-
sponsibility for human rights. But no one should miss the irony of brutal-
izing colonial powers pushing for the Nuremberg trials and the adoption of
the UDHR.
Perhaps more importantly, two of the oldest and most prestigious human
rights INGOs-the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Amnesty
International (A)--were established to deal with human rights violations in
Europe, not the Third World. The ICJ was formed as a tool for the West in
be attributed to the monstrous violations of human rights of the Hitler era and to the belief that these
violations and possibly the war itself might have been prevented had an effective international system for
the protection of human rights existed." THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
NUTSHELL 21 (1995).
40. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Star. 1544 [hereinafter London Agreement].
41. HOWARD B. TOLLEY, JR., THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS: GLOBAL ADVOCATES
FoR HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1994).
42. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established in 1945 by the London
Agreement, resulting from conferences held among the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet
Union to determine what policies the victorious allies should pursue against the defeated Germans, Ital-
ians, and their surrogates. London Agreement, supra note 40.
43. See Kenneth Anderson, Nuremberg Sensibility: Teford Taylor's Memoir of the Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARv.
HUm. RTS. J. 281 (1994) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS (1992)).
Nuremberg has been criticized for the Allies' selective prosecution of war criminals and their inventive-
ness of the applicable law. Nuremberg also has been labeled a gross demonstration of the powers of the
victors over the vanquished. U.S. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone said the Nuremberg trials had a "false
facade of legality" and were "a little too sanctimonious a fraud to meet my old-fashioned ideas." ALPHEUS
THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 715-16 (1956).
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the Cold War.44 According to AJ.M. van Dal of the Netherlands, one of its
original officials, the mission of the ICJ was to "mobilize the forces-in par-
ticular the juridical forces--of the free world for the defense of our funda-
mental legal principles, and in so doing to organize the fight against all
forms of systematic injustice in the Communist countries."45 AI was
launched in 1961 by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer, to protest the impris-
onment, torture, or execution of prisoners held in Romania, Hungary,
Greece, Portugal, and the United States because of their political opinions or
religious beliefs. 46 In all of these cases, the targets of AI were European or
American, and not the Third World.
Thus, the human rights movement originated in Europe to curb European
savageries such as the Holocaust, the abuses of Soviet bloc Communism, and
the denials of speech and other expressive rights in a number of Western
countries. The movement grew initially out of the horrors of the West, con-
structing the image of a European savage. The European human rights sys-
tem, which is now a central attribute of European legal and political iden-
tity, is designed to hold member states to particular standards of conduct in
their treatment of individuals.47 It is, as it were, the bulwark against the re-
emergence of the unbridled European savage-the phenomenon that gave
rise to and fueled the Third Reich.
The human rights corpus, only put into effect following the atrocities of
the Second World War, had its theoretical underpinnings in Western colo-
nial attitudes. It is rooted in a deep-seated sense of European and Western
global predestination.48 As put by David Slater, European "belief in the ne-
cessity of an imperial mission to civilize the other and to convert other socie-
ties into inferior versions of the same" took hold in the nineteenth century.49
This impulse to possess and transform that which was different found a
ready mask and benign cover in messianic faiths. For example, Denys Shrop-
shire, a European Christian missionary, described Africans as "primitive"
natives in the "technically barbaric and pre-literary stage of sociological and
cultural development."'50 The purpose of the missionary was not "merely to
civilize but to Christianize, not merely to convey the 'Gifts of Civiliza-
44. See ToLLEY, supra note 41, at 25-44.
45. Dudley Bonsai, Lawyers and the Cold War in Cooperation with the ICJ, Minutes of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, May 4, 1953, quoted in ToLLuY, supra note 41, at 34.
46. Ian Martin, The New World Order: Opportunity or Threat for Human Rights, Edward A. Smith
Lecture at the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (Apr. 14, 1993), available at http:lwww.
law.harvard.edulprograms/HRP/Publications/martin.html (visited on Nov. 9, 2000).
47. The European human rights system, which includes the European Commission on Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights, is central to the European Union. The system was put in
place following the atrocities of the Second World War. See, e.g., BUERGENTHAL, supra note 39, at 102-
73; Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theoty of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
48. See Slater, supra note 2, at 100.
49. Id.
50. DENYS W. T. SHROPSHIRE, THE CHURCH AND PRIMITIVE PEOPLES, at xiii (1938).
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tion." '51 By the nineteenth century, the discourse of white over black superi-
ority had gained popularity and acceptance in Europe:
The advocates of this discourse-[German philosopher Georg] Hegel
most typically, but duly followed by a host of 'justifiers'--declared that
Africa had no history prior to direct contact with Europe. Therefore the
Africans, having made no history of their own, had clearly made no de-
velopment of their own. Therefore they were not properly human, and
could not be left to themselves, but must be "led" towards civilization
by other peoples: that is, by the peoples of Europe, especially of West-
ern Europe, and most particularly of Britain and France. 52
As if by intuition, the missionary fused religion with civilization, a proc-
ess that was meant to remove the native from the damnation of prehistory
and to deliver him to the gates of history. In this idiom, human develop-
ment was defined as a linear and vertical progression of the dark or backward
races from the savage to the civilized, the pre-modern to the modern, from
the child to the adult, and the inferior to the superior.53 Slater has captured
this worldview in a powerful passage:
[The geological power over other societies, legitimated and codified
under the signs of manifest destiny and civilizing missions, has been a
rather salient feature of earlier Western projects of constructing new
world orders. These projects or domains of truth, as they emanated from
Europe or the United States, attempted to impose their hegemony by
defining normalcy with reference to a particular vision of their own cul-
tures, while designating that which was different as other than truth
and in need of tutelage. 54
The United States, whose history is simply a continuation of the Age of
Europe,55 suffers from this worldview just like its European predecessors.
American predestination, as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, is almost as
51. Id. at 425.
52. BASIL DAVIDSON, AFRICA IN HISTORY, at xvi (1991).
53. A description of Henry the Navigator is telling:
The heathen lands were kingdoms to be won for Christ, and the guidance of their backward races
was a duty that must not be shirked. Henrique shouldered this responsibility. If he had the spirit of
a crusader, he had that of a missionary as well. Where he explored his aim was to evangelize, to
civilize, and educate the simple savages with whom his seamen made contact. He sent out teachers
and preachers to the black men of Senegal.
ELAINE SANCEAU, HENRY TIiE NAVIGATOR 139 (n.d.).
54. See Slater, supra note 2, at 100.
55. As I have written elsewhere, the term "Age of Europe" denotes a "historical and philosophical
paradigm; that of European hegemony imposed over the globe, particularly the South, over the last five
centuries, culminating in the domination of the Americas, Africa, and parts bf Asia by Western European
norms and forms in the fields of government, religion, society, culture, and the economy." Makau wa
Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113, 1114 n.5
(1995).
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old as the country itself President Theodore Roosevelt expressed this sense
of predestination when he referred to peoples and countries south of the
United States as the "weak and chaotic governments and people south of us"
and declared that it was "our duty, when it becomes absolutely inevitable, to
police these countries in the interest of order and civilization. ' 56 The treat-
ment of the Portuguese and Spanish-speaking Latin America as being in the
backyard of the United States was instrumental in consolidating the psyche
of the United States as an empire.
In the last several hundred years, the globe has witnessed the universaliza-
tion of Eurocentric norms and cultural forms through the creation of the
colonial state and the predominance of certain economic, social, and political
models. International law itself was founded on the preeminence of four
specific European biases: geographic Europe as the center, and Christianity,
mercantile economics, and political imperialism as superior paradigms."
Both the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, revital-
ized and confirmed European-American domination of international affairs.
In the post-War period, non-European states were trusted or mandated to
Western powers or became client states of one or another Western state.58
Since 1945, the United Nations has played a key role in preserving the
global order that the West dominates. A critically important agenda of the
United Nations has been the universalization of principles and norms which
are European in identity. Principal among these has been the spread of hu-
man rights which grow out of Western liberalism and jurisprudence. 59 The
West was able to impose its philosophy of human rights on the rest of the
56. DANA G. MUNRO, INTERVENTION AND DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN THE CARIBBEAN 1900-1921, at
76 (1964). William Alford has captured well the evolution of this American sense of predestination:
The United States has a long history of endeavoring to enlighten, if not save, our foreign brethren
by exporting ideas and institutions that we believe we have realized more fully. These include ef-
forts to bring "civilization," principally in the form of Christianity, to age-old civilizations in Asia,
Africa, and elsewhere; to foster "modernization," especially as manifested through economic devel-
opment; and to expound a gospel of science and technology. With the ebbing of the Cold War, de-
mocracy promotion-a capacious term used to encompass efforts to nurture electoral processes, the
rule of law, and civil society, all broadly defined-has become a key organizing principle of Ameri-
can foreign policy, if not this nation's broader interface with the world.
William P. Alford, Exporting "The Pursuit of Happiness," 113 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1678-79 (2000) (re-
viewing THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE (1999)).
57. Mohammed Bedjaoui of the International Court of Justice has written, "This classic international
law thus consisted of a set of rules with a geographical bias (it was a European law), a religious-ethical
inspiration (it was a Christian law), an economic motivation (it was a mercantilist law) and political aims
(it was an imperialist law)." Mohammed Bedjaoui, Poverty of the International Order, in INTERNATIONAL
LAw: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 153, 154 (Richard Fallk er al. eds., 1985).
58. See generally Otto, supra note 24, at 339-40. Note that the U.N. Security Council, the only organ
of the United Nations that wields real power, has been dominated by the United States, United King-
dom, France, and formerly the Soviet Union. China, the only permanent non-European member of the
Security Council, has traditionally been isolated by the three Western powers that control it.
59. See Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Western Liberalism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRIcA: CROSS-
CULTURA . PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 31; Virginia Leary, The Effect of Western Perspectives on Interna-
tional Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at
15.
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world because it dominated the United Nations at its inception. 60 The fal-
lacy of the UDHR, which refers to itself as the "common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations," 61 is now underscored by the
identification of human rights norms with political democracy. The princi-
pal focus of human rights law has been on those rights that strengthen, le-
gitimize, and export the liberal democratic state to non-Western societies. 62
Some scholars have argued that democratic governance has evolved from a
moral prescription to an international legal obligation.63 According to
Thomas Franck, the right to democratic governance is supported by a large
normative human rights cannon. 64 He asserts that people almost everywhere,
including Africa and Asia, "now demand that government be validated by
[Wlestern-style parliamentary, multiparty democratic process." 65 He con-
cludes, rather triumphantly, that:
This almost-complete triumph of the democratic notions of Hume,
Locke, Jefferson and Madison-in Latin America, Africa, Eastern
Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia-may well prove to be the most
profound event of the twentieth century and, in all likelihood, the fill-
crum on which the future development of global society will turn. It is
the unanswerable response to those who have said that free, open, mul-
tiparty, electoral parliamentary democracy is neither desired nor desir-
able outside a small enclave of [Wiestern industrial states.66
Franck presents the apparent triumph of liberal democratic nationalism as
the free, uncoerced choice of non-Western peoples.
It may appear that Third World states have participated in the legitimiza-
tion of the human rights corpus, particularly at the United Nations, the
institution most responsible for the creation and universalization of human
rights norms. However, too much should not be made of this Third World
participation in the making of human rights law.67 The levers of power at
60. Antonio Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITIcAL APPRAISAL 25, 31-32 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
61. UDHR, sipra note 1,pmbl.
62. The human rights corpus has been concerned mainly with the development of civil and political
rights in a scheme that leads to the construction of a liberal state. The application of human rights norms
appears to lead to the typology of state governed by the project of constitutionalism. Such a state yields
the following key characteristics: the government rests on popular sovereignty; accountability for politi-
cal leadership by the populace is exercised through various devices such as open, periodic, and competi-
tive elections; government is limited through the separation of powers; the judiciary is independent to
safeguard the rule of law; and individual civil and political rights are sanctified. See STEINER & ALSTON,
supra note 1, at 710-25.
63. See Franck, supra note 37; see also Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L 539 (1992).
64. Franck, supra note 37, at 79.
65. Id. at 49.
66. Id.
67. Virginia Leary, for instance, notes that:
Western influence, dominant in the origin of the development of international human rights norms,
is now only one of a number of cultural influences on the development of international human
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the United Nations and other international law-making fora have tradition-
ally been out of the reach of the Third World. And even if they were within
reach, it is doubtful that most Third World states actually represent their
peoples and cultures. In other words, a claim about the universality or de-
mocratization of human rights norm-making at the United Nations cannot
be made simply by looking at the numerical domination of that body by
Third World states.
The human rights movement is not only lacking in Third World legiti-
macy, but also it is aimed primarily at the Third World. It is one thing for
Europeans and North Americans, whose states share a common philosophi-
cal and legal ancestry, to create a common political and cultural template to
govern their societies. It is quite another to insist that their particular vision
of society is the only permissible civilization which must now be imposed on
all human societies, particularly those outside Europe. The merits of the
European and American civilization of human rights notwithstanding, all
missionary work is suspect and might easily seem as part of the colonial
project. Once again, the allegedly superior Europeans and North Americans
descend on supposedly backward natives in the Third World with the hu-
man rights mission to free them from the claws of despotic governments and
benighted cultures.
But the human rights project is no longer just a critique of the Third
World by the West. Individual states of all cultural and political traditions,
including those in the Third World, have taken coercive measures against
other states in the name of human rights. Based on imported Western norms
and definitions, many NGOs in the Third World openly oppose human
rights violations committed by their own states and societies. Non-
Europeans now confront each other within the confines of their states over
the enforcement of human rights. The observance or denial of human rights
now pits African against African, Arab against Arab, and Asian against
Asian.
Today, most of the activities of the ICJ, Al, and the other Western-based
INGOs, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, and the International Human Rights Law Group, are fo-
cused on the Third World. As a consequence, the predominant image of the
savage in the human rights discourse today is that of a Third World, non-
European person, cultural practice, or state.
At first blush, there appear to be sufficient grounds for the INGOs' unre-
lenting emphasis on Third World states as the foci for their work. As a gen-
eral rule, INGOs concentrate their work on the violations of civil and politi-
cal rights-the species of legal protections associated with a functioning
rights standards. Its contribution to the development of human rights has been great, but it has not
been unique, and other cultures have made and are making significant contributions to our collec-
tive conception of human dignity.
Leay, supra note 59, at 30.
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political democracy. Admittedly, there are more undemocratic states in the
Third World than in the developed West. Third World despots have acted
with impunity. Violations of civil and political rights and the plunder of
Third World economies by their leaders are common and flagrant. The
spotlight by INGOs here is appropriate, necessary, and welcome, particu-
larly where local advocacy groups and the press have been muzzled or suffo-
cated by the state. There is no doubt that mechanisms for the protections of
human rights are more fragile in many Third World states, if they exist at
all.
But while this explains the work of INGOs in the Third World, it does
not excuse their relative inactivity on human rights violations in the West.
Western countries, like the United States, are notorious for their violations
of the civil rights of racial minorities and the poor. Although both AI and
HRW have haltingly started to breach the publicity and advocacy barriers in
these areas, 68 such reports have been sparse and episodic, and have given the
impression of a public relations exercise, designed to mute critics who
charge INGOs with a lopsided Third World focus.
The ravages of globalization notwithstanding, INGOs have largely re-
mained deaf to calls for advocacy on social and economic rights.69 There cer-
tainly is no sufficient defense for their failure to address the violations of
economic and social rights by Western states.70 It is true, of course, that
dominant public discourse in the West generally opposed the mainstream-
ing of an agenda for economic and social rights, and instead characterized
them as inimical to free enterprise. But in reality, most countries-socialist,
capitalist, and Third World-have never seriously sought to fulfill eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, even those which rhetorically championed
them, such as the Soviet Union.
68. Se AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY
(1999); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
69. For example, HRW recently declined to co-publish a study on trade and human rights [MAKAU
MUTUA & ROBERT HOwsE, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2000)], although it had jointly commissioned it with the Montreal-
based International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development.
70. HRW is the only major INGO to pay some attention to economic and social rights, although its
1996 policy was so nebulous that it has been relegated to the margins. See Muua, The Ideology of Human
Rights, supra note 5, at 619. Although HRW has recently reported on corporations and human rights,
such activity remains very restricted and highly unsatisfactory. Here, HRW has taken on "easier" or less
stigmatized economic and social rights such as labor rights in the Third World-which Western states
now advocate because of pressure from organized labor in their countries-and the atrocities committed
by oil companies in complicity with repressive governments. The violations of labor rights around the
world-particularly in developing and industrializing countries such as India, Vietnam, and Pakistan, to
name a few-have become a sort of a cause cdlebre in the West. The prominence of these violations in the
Western press have increased pressure on them to act. Still, INGOs have not tackled the more difficult
questions of official corruption within governments, transnational corporations, and the pernicious effects
of globalization on the rights to health, the environment, education, and land. In its most important
report of the year, a 517-page tome, HRW only devoted a scant five pages to economic and social rights.
Se HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000, at 464-69 (1999).
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The historical pattern is undeniable. It forms a long queue of the colonial
administrator, the Bible-wielding Christian missionary, the merchant of free
enterprise, the exporter of political democracy, and now the human rights
zealot. In each case the European culture has pushed the "native" culture to
transform. The local must be replaced with the universal-that is, the Euro-
pean. Are the connections between human rights and particular attributes of
European-American culture-such as hedonism, excess individualism, free
markets, and now globalization--contingent and not organic? Is, in fact, the
text of human rights so open that it is up for grabs, allowing different inter-
ests to make whatever claims they wish on it? In other words, are non-
European cultures better advised to adopt the human rights text to their
specific contexts, but to leave its core in place, if they seek redemption from
their own backwardness? Can they segregate the "good" from the "bad" in
human rights and reject the baggage of the West, while building a culture
that is free from the evils that deny human potential?
Although it is not the purpose of this Article to address particularized na-
tional settings, it is sufficient to note that the SVS metaphor has deep his-
torical parallels in the national histories of states where non-whites, and es-
pecially persons of African ancestry, have been subjected to oppression,
abuse, exploitation, and domination by whites. The history of South Africa,
as told by Nelson Mandela, is not just a testament to the cooperation of
black and white South Africans against apartheid.7 1 There is in that history a
strong undercurrent of white benefactors, sometimes pejoratively referred to
as "do-gooders," a species of humans cut from the abolitionist cloth.72 Dur-
ing the darkest days of apartheid, many individual white lawyers, white law
firms, and white human rights organizations spoke for and defended black
South Africans.7 3 Many whites became key leaders in what was essentially a
black liberation struggle.7 4 In the United States, from the earliest days of
71. For a history of South Africa, and in particular the struggle against apartheid, see NELSON MAN-
DELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NELSON MANDELA (1994).
72. For a discussion of the abolitionist impulse in human rights, see Makau wa Mutua, The Politics of
Human Rights: Beyond the Abolitionist Paradigm in Africa, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 591 (1996) (reviewing
CLAUDE E. WELCH, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND ROLES OF NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995)).
73. For example, the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), one of the best known anti-apartheid human
rights organizations, was established by white lawyers in 1979 as a public interest law firm. Among the
more famous white liberals to lead the LRC was Arthur Chaskalson who, in 1994, became the first Presi-
dent of the Constitutional Court, South Africa's highest court. For a brief history of the LRC, see PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW AROUND THE WORLD 159-63 (Julius L. Chambers et al. eds., 1992). For the racialization
of the South African criminal justice system, and the exclusion of black Africans from the legal profes-
sion, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Mandela to Mthwana: Providing Counsel to the Unrepresented Accused in
South Africa, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1995).
74. Among the more famous whites to participate in South Africa's liberation struggle were the late
Joe Slovo, the leader of the South African Communist Party, a key ally of the African National Congress,
and Albie Sachs, the renowned jurist-activist who, in 1994, became a justice of South Afrira's Constitu-
tional Court. Nelson Mandela recalled with fondness the lifelong political relationships that he formed
with whites, including Slovo, whom he had met while a law student at the University of the Witwa-
tersrand. MANDELA, supra note 71, at 84.
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the enslavement of Africans by whites up to the civil rights movement,
whites often played important roles in the struggle for equality by blacks.
As in South Africa, many American whites held key positions in the fight
for civil rights.7 5 It seems politically incorrect to consign white participation
in these noble causes to the SVS metaphor. But it is an unavoidable conclu-
sion that the metaphor largely describes their involvement. It would also be
a tragic historical error not to recognize the importance of those struggles to
the liberal project and its centrality to democracy and the freedom of whites
as a people themselves.
The purpose of this Article is not to assign ignoble intentions or motiva-
tions on the individual proponents, leaders, or participants in the human
rights movement. Without a doubt many of the leaders and foot-soldiers of
the human rights movement are driven by a burning desire to end human
suffering, as they see it from their vantage point. The white American sub-
urban high school or college student who joins the local chapter of AI and
protests FGM in far away lands or writes letters to political or military lead-
ers whose names do not easily roll off the English tongue are no doubt
drawing partly from a well of noblesse oblige. The zeal to see all humanity
as related and the impulse to help those defined as in need is noble and is
not the problem addressed here. A certain degree of human universality is
inevitable and desirable. But what that universality is, what historical and
cultural stew it is made of, and how it is accomplished make all the differ-
ence. What the high school or college student ought to realize is that her
zeal to save others--even from themselves-is steeped in Western and
European history. If one culture is allowed the prerogative of imperialism,
the right to define and impose on others what it deems good for humanity,
the very meaning of freedom itself will have been abrogated. That is why a
human rights movement that pivots on the SVS metaphor violates the very
idea of the sanctity of humanity that purportedly inspires it.
III. THE METAPHOR OF THE SAVAGE
Human rights law frames the state as its primary target. Although volun-
tarily entered into, human rights treaties are binding on the state. 76 The
75. For example, in 1961,Jack Greenberg, a white, was handpicked by Thurgood Marshall to succeed
him as the director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. JACK GREENBERG,
CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED BAND OF LAwYERs FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 294-95 (1994). Greenberg was also instrumental in the establishment of the LRC in South
Africa. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 73, at 159. On the controversy of white
liberals and their involvement in civil rights, see Randall Kennedy, On Cussing Out White Liberals, THE
NATION, Sept. 4, 1982, at 169.
76. Human rights treaties are negotiated by states and are meant to bind them. States undertake in
human rights treaties to respect the rights contained therein. For example, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) gives individuals a multitude of rights and then declares that "Each
State Party... undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). All
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state is both the guarantor and subject of human rights. Underlying the de-
velopment of human rights is the belief that the state is a predator that must
be contained. Otherwise it will devour and imperil human freedom. From
this conventional international human rights law perspective, the state is the
classic savage.
But it is not the state per se that is predatory, for the state in itself is sim-
ply a construct that describes a repository for public power, a disinterested
instrumentality ready to execute public will, whatever that may be. There is
a high degree of fluidity in the nature of that power and how it is exercised.
For instance, a state's constitutional structure could in its configuration re-
quire a particular form of democratic government. Or a state's constitution
could locate public power in religious bodies and clerics, as has been the case
in the Islamic Republic of Iran.77 However, a state could, through revolution
or some other device, be Islamic today and secular tomorrow. Since the state
in this construction appears to be an empty vessel, the savage must be lo-
cated beyond the state.
The state should be unmasked as being a mere proxy for the real savage.
That leaves the historically accumulated wisdom, the culture of a society, as
the only other plausible place to locate the savage. I have argued elsewhere
that culture "represents the accumulation of a people's wisdom and thus
their identity; it is real and without it a people is without a name, rudder-
less, and torn from its moorings. s78 In this sense, culture is a set of local
truths which serve as a guide for life's many pursuits in a society. The valid-
ity of a cultural norm is a local truth, and judgment or evaluation of that
truth by a norm from an external culture is extremely problematic, if not
-altogether an invalid exercise. 79 But culture itself is a dynamic and alchemi-
cal mix of many variables, including religion, philosophy, history, mythol-
ogy, politics, environmental factors, language, and economics. The interac-
tion of these variables-both within the culture and through influence by
other cult'uds--produces competing social visions and values in any given
.society. The dominant class or political interests that capture the state make
it the public expression of their particular cultural vision. That is to say, the
state is more a conveyer belt than an embodiment of particular cultural
norms. The state is but the scaffolding underneath which the real savage
resides. Thus, when human rights norms target a deviant state, they are
really attacking the normative cultural fabric or variant expressed by that
other human rights treaties have similar obligatory language. Thus, although states voluntarily enter into
treaty obligations, they are bound by them once ratified.
77. The Iranian constitution provides for the supremacy of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the
Guardian Council over many areas including legislation and the adoption of international agreements.
IRaN CoNsT. art. 71-99.
78. Makau Mutua, Returning to My Roots: African "Religions" and the State, in PROSELYTIZING AND
COMMUNAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN AFRIcA 169, 170 (Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1999).
79. See ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUEs IN ANTHROPOLOGY 8
(1983). See also The Executive Board, Am. Anthropological Ass'n, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 539 (1947).
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state. The culture, and not the state, is the actual savage. From this perspec-
tive, human rights violations represent a clash between the culture of human
rights and the savage culture.
The view that human rights is an ideology with deep roots in liberalism
and democratic forms of government is now supported by senior human
rights academics in the West.80 The cultural biases of the human rights cor-
pus can only be properly understood if it is contextualized within liberal
theory and philosophy. Understood from this position, human rights become
an ideology with a specific cultural and ethnographic fingerprint. 81 The hu-
man rights corpus expresses a cultural bias, and its chastening of a state is
therefore a cultural project. If culture is not defined as some discrete, exotic,
and peculiar practice which is frozen in time but rather as the dynamic to-
tality of ideas, forms, practices, and structures of any given society, then
human rights, as it is currently conceived, is an expression of a particular
European-American culture. The advocacy of human rights across cultural
borders is then an attempt to displace the local culture with the "universal"
culture of human rights. Human rights, therefore, become the universal cul-
ture. It is in this sense that the "other" culture, that which is non-European,
is the savage in the human rights corpus and its discourse.
In major international human rights instruments, the "other" culture is
quite often depicted as the evil that must be overcome by human rights it-
self. An example is the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW), 82 which is based on equality and
anti-discrimination, the two basic and preeminent norms of the human
rights corpus. The most transformatively radical human rights treaty, CE-
DAW refers to offending "social and cultural patterns '83 and demands that
the state take all appropriate measures to transform attitudes and practices
that are inimical to women. 84 The treaty explicitly requires that states seek
the "elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices" that
are based on the ideas of the inequality of the sexes. 85
80. See Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, 20 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 656 (15th ed. 1992);
Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, supra note 5; Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, supra
note 1; HENKIN, supra note 17, at x; JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1989); Adamantia Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited
AMlicablity, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Adamantia Pollis &
Peter Schwab eds., 1979); Cassese, supra note 60, at 25.
81. Steiner has stated that "[olbservers from different regions and cultures can agree that the human
rights movement, with respect to its language of rights and the civil and political rights that it declares,
stems primarily from the liberal tradition of Western thought." STEINER & A.STON, supra note 1, at
187.
82. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14
(enteed intoforte Sept. 3,1981).
83. Id. at pt. 1, art. 5(a).
84. See generally Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, supra
note 82.
85. Id. at pt. 1, art. 5(a).
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While there are no cultures that are innocent of discriminatory practices
against women, human rights discourse treats non-Western cultures as par-
ticularly problematic in this regard. For example, in its first report, the
Women's Rights Project of HRW focused on wife-murder, domestic battery,
and rape in Brazil. 6 Significant here is the fact that HRW's first report on
violations of women's human rights did not focus on the wife-murder, do-
mestic battery, and rape commonplace in the United States or a European
country but rather on Brazil, a Third World state. Other reports by the
Women's Rights Project have concentrated on violations in Indonesia, Bot-
swana, Haiti, and Turkey, which is Muslim and on the periphery of
Europe. 7
The impression left by the reports and the activities of powerful INGOs is
unmistakable. While the West is presented as the cradle of a feminist
movement, countries in the South have been constructed as steeped in tradi-
tions and practices which are harmful to women. In one of her first reports,
Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women, confirmed this impression when she noted that "[c]ertain custom-
ary practices and some aspects of tradition are often the cause of violence
against women."88 She noted that "besides female genital mutilation, a
whole host of practices violate female dignity. Foot binding, male prefer-
ence, early marriage, virginity tests, dowry deaths, sati, female infanticide
and malnutrition are among the many practices that violate a woman's hu-
man rights. '89 All of these practices are found in non-Western cultures. Im-
ages of practices such as FGM, dowry burnings, and honor killings have
come to frame the discourse, and in that vein stigmatize non-Western cul-
tures.
Elsewhere, non-European political traditions, which lie outside the liberal
tradition and do not yield political democratic structures, are demonized in
the text of human rights and its discourse. Take, for example, the view ex-
pressed by human rights documents in the area of political participation.
Here, the human rights corpus expects all societies to support a pluralist,
democratic society. Both the UDHR and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the two key documents in the area of
86. Brazil: Criminal Injustice: Violence Against Women in Brazil, WOMEN's RTs. PROj. (Hua. RTs.
WATcHdWomen's Rights Project Watch, New York, N.Y.), 1991.
87. Indonesia: The Damaging Debate on Rapes ofEthnic Chinese Women, WOMEN'S RTs. PROJ. (Hum. RTs.
WATcH/Women's Rights Project, New York, N.Y), Sept. 1998; Botswana: Second Class Citizens: Discrimi-
nation Against Women Under Botswana's Citizenship Act, WOMEN'S RTS. PROJ. (Huh. RTS,
WATcHlWomen's Rights Project, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1994; Haiti: Rape in Haiti: A Weapon ofTerror,
WOMEN'S RTS. PROJ. (HUM. RTS. WATcHlWomen's Rights Project, New York, N.Y.), July 1994; A
Matter of Power State Control of Women's Virginity in Turkey, WOMEN'S RTs. PROJ. (HUM. RTS,
WATCH/Women's Rights Project, New York, N.Y.), June 1994. In an encouraging move, however, HRW
also produced a report on the violations of women's human rights in Michigan state prisons. See U.S.:
Retaliation Against Women in Michigan State Prisons, WoMaN's RTS. PROJ. (Hum. RTS. WATCH/Women's
Rights Project, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1998.
88. U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., Agenda Item 11(a), at para. 67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995142 (1994).
89. Id.
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civil and political rights, are explicit about the primacy of rights of expres-
sion and association. They both give citizens the right to political participa-
tion through elections and the guarantee of the right to assemble, associate,
and disseminate their ideas. 90 This scheme of rights coupled with equal pro-
tection and due process rights implies a political democracy or a political
society with a regularly elected government, genuine competition for politi-
cal office, and separation of powers with judicial independence. While it is
true that the human rights regime does not dictate the particular permuta-
tion or strain of political democracy, it suggests a Western-style liberal de-
mocracy nevertheless. Systems of government such as monarchies, theocra-
cies, dictatorships, and one party-states would violate rights of association
and run afbul of the human rights corpus. 91 When it rejects non-Western
political cultures as undemocratic, the human rights corpus raises the spec-
ter of political savagery.
In scholarship by many Western academics, the same sharp contrast is
drawn between human rights supporters and the cultural or political savage
who must be civilized by human rights. Industrial democracies in the last
two decades have worked to link human rights to aspects of foreign policy
such as development assistance, aid, and trade with non-Western states.92
Such linkage requires the recipient, usually a non-Western state, to conform
aspects of its domestic laws, policies, or programs to human rights or demo-
cratic norms. The coercive maneuver is intended to civilize the offending
state. In this sense, Western states frequently use human rights as a tool of
foreign policy against non-Western states. 93
Some writers have depicted certain practices as part of a savage culture. In
the gruesome conflict following the collapse of Yugoslavia, genocide and
other war crimes were perpetrated with chilling callousness. In particular,
one of the most horrifying war crimes was the massive rape by Serbs of
Muslim Bosnian women, with some reports estimating as many as 20,000
victims. 94 Todd Salzman characterizes these offenses as "an assault against
90. The following provisions of the ICCPR are illustrative: Article 21 on assembly, Article 22 on free-
dom of association, Article 25 on political participation, Article 19 on expression, and Article 18 on free
thought, conscience, and religion. ICCPR, supra note 76. The UDHR includes Article 21 on political
participation, Article 20 on assembly, and Article 19 on freedom of opinion and expression. UDHR,
supra note 1.
91. Steiner, The Youth ofRights, supra note 7, at 930-31.
92. See AM. ASS'N FOR THE INT'L COmmiss'N OF JUsISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POL-
ICY: THE FIRST DECADE 1973-1983 (1984); THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE
LEARNING CURVE (1999); Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Prac-
trce, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246 (1982); Demetrios James Marantis, Human Rights, Democracy and Development:
The Emvpoean Community Model, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (1994).
93. Henkin notes that the extensive human rights efforts abroad by the United States are attributable
to conceptions of individual rights that "dominate [America's] constitutional jurisprudence, and are the
pride of its people, their banner to the world." HENKIN, supra note 17, at 65.
94. Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Working Paper on the Situation of Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and
Slavy-like Pracicas During Wartime, Including Internal Armed Conflict, Submitted by Ms. Linda Chavez in
Accordan with Sukommission Decision 1994/109, U.N. ESCOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 16, at 2-3, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/38 (1995). See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & MARCIA MCCORMICK, SEXUAL
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the female gender, violating her body and its reproductive capabilities as a
'weapon of war."' 95 He traces these atrocities to a savage Serbian patriarchal
culture that usurps the female body and reduces the female to "her reproduc-
tive capacities in order to fulfill the overall objective of Serbian nationalism
by producing more citizens to populate the nation."96 According to Salz-
man, this view of the female body is deeply rooted in Serbian culture, the
Serbian Orthodox Church, and Serbian official policies.97 The savage here is
located in religion, politics, and culture which the state supports and im-
plements for the purpose of creating "Greater Serbia."
The image of the savage is also painted impressively by INGOs in their
work through reporting and other forms of public advocacy. The focus here
is not on domestic human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in the Third World because many simply imitate the practices of their
predecessors in the North.98 Typically, INGOs perform three basic functions:
investigation, reporting, and advocacy.99 The focus of human rights INGOs
is usually human rights violations in a Third World country, where the "in-
vestigation" normally takes place. Generally, a Western-based INGO-typi-
cally based in the political and cultural capitals of the most powerful coun-
tries in the West' 00-sends a team of investigators called a human rights
mission to a country in the South. The mission lasts anywhere from several
days to a few weeks, and collects data and other information on human
rights questions from victims, local NGOs, lawyers, local journalists, human
rights defenders, and government officials. Information from these local
sources is usually cross-checked with other, supposedly more objective
sources-meaning Western embassies, locally based Western reporters, and
other Western interests such as foundations. Upon returning to the West,
the mission systematizes the information and releases it in the form of a re-
port.
The human rights report is a catalogue of abuses committed by the state
against liberal values. 101 It criticizes the state for departing from the civil
and political rights obligations provided for in the major instruments. Its
purpose is to shame the Third World state by pointing out the gulf between
the state's conduct and internationally sanctioned civilized behavior. This
VIOLENCE: AN INVISIBLE WEAPON OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1996).
95. Todd A. Salzman, Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethnic Responses
to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 348, 349 (1998).
96. Id. at 349.
97. Id. at 349-52.
98. See, e.g., Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, supra note 5, at 597.
99. For a helpful overview of the investigative processes of INGOs, see Diane R Orentlicher, Bearing
Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-Finding, 3 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 83 (1990).
100. None of the major INGOs have located their headquarters in the Third World. Al is headquar-
tered in London; HRW is based in New York City; ICJ is based in Geneva; the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights is based in New York City; and the International Human Rights Law Group is based in
Washington, D.C. See, e.g., Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, supra note 5, at 610-12; IsSA G. SHIVJI,
THE CONCEPT OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 34-35 (1989).
101. See, eg., STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS, supra note 6, at 22-25.
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departure from good behavior is stigmatized and used to paint the state ei-
ther as a pariah or out-of-step with the rest of the civilized world. Reports
normally contain corrective measures and recommendations to the offending
state. In many instances, however, the audience of these reports is the West
or some other Western institution, such as the European Union. The pleas of
the INGO report here pit a First World state or institution against a Third
World state or culture. The report asks that the West cut off aid, condition
assistance, impose sanctions, and/or publicly denounce the unacceptable
conduct of the Third World state.10 2 INGOs thus ask First World states and
institutions to play a significant role in "taming" and "civilizing" Third
World states, even though such a role relies on the power and economic im-
balances of the international order which favors the North over the South.10 3
The human rights report also tells another, more interesting, story about
the target of the human rights corpus. In this story, the report describes sev-
eral images of the savage, including the Third World state, the quintessen-
tial savage. Human rights literature is replete with images of blood-thirsty
Third World despots and trigger-happy police and security forces.
Perhaps in no other area than in the advocacy over FGM is the image of
culture as the savage more poignant. The word "mutilation" itself implies
the willful, sadistic infliction of pain on a hapless victim, and stigmatizes
the practitioners and their cultures as barbaric savages. Descriptions of the
practice are so searing and revolting that they evoke images of a barbarism
that defies civilization. 10 4 Although the practice has dissipated over the last
several decades, it is still carried out in parts of Africa and the Middle East.
102. See, e.g., AFRICA WATCH COMMITTEE, KENYA: TAKING LIBERTIES 362-82 (1991) (calling on the
British and American governments to push Kenya proactively towards democracy and more respect for
human rights); ALICE JAY, ROBERT F. KENNEDY MEM'L CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PERSECUTION BY
PRoxY: THE CIVIL PATROLS IN GUATEMALA 69-71 (Kerry Kennedy Cuomo, et al. eds., 1993) (urging
the United States to press Guatemala to abolish and disarm abusive civil patrols).
103. Ian Martin, a former secretary general of Al, has expressed disapproval of advocacy strategies that
exploit power imbalances. He has argued that although many powerfsl Western states appear ready in
the aftermath of the Cold War to use their economic power to compel Third World states to comply with
human rights, INGOs should be suspicious of such offers. "My contention is that this is a prospect which
the human rights movement should view coolly. It should avoid aligning itself with the power relation-
ships of an unjust world and it should recognize the ways in which the cause of human rights requires
that those relationships be challenged." Martin, supra note 46.
104. Of the three forms of female circumcision practiced, two are often described in particularly
graphic and cruel language. First, the mildest form is "circumcision proper" in which only the clitoral
prepuce is removed. Second,
(e~xcison involves the amputation of the whole of the clitoris and all or part of the labia minora.
[Third,] [i4nfibulation, also known as Pharaonic circumcision, involves the amputation of the clitoris,
the whole of the labia minora, and at least the anterior two-thirds and often the whole of the medial
part of the labia majora. The two sides of the vulva are then stitched-together with silk, catgut or
thorns, and a tiny sliver of wood or a reed is inserted to preserve an opening for urine and menstrual
blood. The girl's legs are usually bound together from ankle to knee until the wound has healed,
which may take anything up to 40 days (italics in original).
World Health Org., A Traditional Practice That Threatens Health-Female Circumcision, 40 WORLD
HEALTH CHRON. 31-32 (1986).
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Given Western stereotypes of barbaric natives in the "dark" continent,105
Western advocacy over FGM has evoked images of machete-wielding natives
only too eager to inflict pain on women in their societies.
The speed, for example, with which the 1994 mass killings in Rwanda
took place, and the weapons used, have come to symbolize in the Western
mind the barbarism of Africans. Philip Gourevitch, an American journalist,
was one of the instrumental voices in the creation of this portrayal:
Decimation means the killing of every tenth person in a population,
and in the spring and early summer of 1994 a program of massacres
decimated the Republic of Rwanda. Although the killing was low-tech-
performed largely by machete-it was carried out at dazzling speed: of an origi-
nal population of about seven and a half million, at least eight hundred thou-
sand people were killed in just a hundred days. Rwandans often speak of a
million deaths, and they may be right. The dead of Rwanda accumu-
lated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holo-
caust. It was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (emphasis added).10 6
These images are critical in the construction of the savage. Human rights
opposition and campaigns against FGM, which have relied heavily on de-
monization, have picked up where European colonial missionaries left off.107
Savagery in this circumstance acquires a race-the black, dark, or non-
Western race. The Association of African Women for Research and Devel-
opment (AAWORD), by contrast, opposed female circumcision but sharply
denounced the racism inherent in Western-led, anti-FGM campaigns:
This new crusade of the West has been led out of the moral and cultural
prejudices of Judaeo-Christian Western society: aggressiveness, igno-
rance or even contempt, paternalism and activism are the elements
which have infuriated and then shocked many people of good will. In
trying to reach their own public, the new crusaders have fallen back on
sensationalism, and have become insensitive to the dignity of the very
women they want to "save." 08
105. Images of African savagery, for example, are standard fare in the American press. Reporting on
the killings of eight Western tourists in Uganda in March 1999, a journalist characterized the suspected
killers as "100 Rwandan Hums, screaming and brandishing machetes and guns," and expressed surprise
that there were not more fatalities "given the killers' barbarism." Romesh Ratnesar, In Uganda, Vacation
Dreams Turn to Nightmares, TME, Mar. 15, 1999, at 64.
106. PHILIP GOUREVITcH, WE WISH TO INFORb You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAmILEs 3 (1998).
107. See generally Lewis & Gunning, supra note 10; JOMO KENYATrA, FACING MOUNT KENYA: THE
TRnnAL LIFE OF THE GIKUYU 130-54 (1953).
108. AAWORD, A Statement on Genital Mutilation, in THIRD WORLD-SECOND SEX: WOMEN'S
STRUGGLES AND NATIONAL LIBERATION 217-18 (Miranda Davies ed., 1983). See also Gunning, supra
note 10; Yael Tamir, Hands Off Clitoridecsomy, BOSTON REv., Summer 1996, at 21.
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AAWORD vigorously questioned the motives of Western activists and
suggested that they were twice victimizing African women. I-t stopped just
short of asking Western activists to drop the crusade, yet openly denounced
the use of the SVS metaphor:
[Western crusaders) are totally unconscious of the latent racism which
such a campaign evokes in countries where ethnocentric prejudice is so
deep-rooted. And in their conviction that this is a "just cause," they
have forgotten that these women from a different race and a different
culture are also human beings, and that solidarity can only exist alongside
self-affirmation and mutual respect (emphasis in original).10 9
As illustrated by the debate over FGM, advocacy across cultural barriers is
an extremely complex matter. Making judgements across the cultural divide
is a risky business because the dice are always heavily loaded. Not even the
black-white pretense of human rights can erase those risks. But since that is
precisely what the human rights movement does-make judgements across
cultures-there is an obligation to create truly universal standards. Other-
wise, the human rights enterprise will continue to present itself as a struggle
between the cultures of non-Western peoples and the "universal" culture of
the West.
IV. THE METAPHOR OF THE VICTIM
The metaphor of the victim is the giant engine that drives the human
rights movement. Without the victim there is no savage or savior, and the
entire human rights enterprise collapses. This section examines the victim
from the perspective of the United Nations, human rights treaties, human
rights law, and, especially, human rights literature. Also, race and the legacy
of colonialism, as intertwined in the victim identity, are examined.
The basic purpose of the human rights corpus is to contain the state,
transform society, and eliminate both the victim and victimhood as condi-
tions of human existence. In fact, the human rights regime was designed to
respond to both the potential and actual victim, and to create legal, politi-
cal, social, and cultural arrangements to defang the state. The human rights
text and its discourse present political democracy, and its institutions of
governance, as the sine qua non for a victimless society.
On the international level, the United Nations pursues civilizing cam-
paigns that ostensibly seek to prevent conditions that create human victims,
109. AAWORD, supra note 108, at 218. As further expressed by Lewis:
A primary concern in African feminist texts is the tendency among Western human rights activists
to essentialize the motivations for practicing FGS [Female Genital Surgery] as rooted in either su-
perstition or in the passive acceptance of patriarchal domination. In rejecting these characteriza-
tions, African feminists seek to recapture and control the representation of their own cultural heri-
tage.
Lewis, supra note 10, at 31.
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to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,"110 to "establish
conditions under which justice" can be maintained,"' and to "reaffirm faith
in fundamental human rights." 112 Human rights treaties are therefore a se-
ries of obligations assumed by states to prevent the creation of victims. To
accomplish this, the state obligates itself to three basic duties for every basic
human right: to avoid depriving, to protect from deprivation, and to aid the
deprived. 1 3 The first duty, being negative, may be the least costly and
mainly requires self-restraint; the latter two are positive and demand the
expenditure of more resources and the implementation of programs.
Human rights law protects against the invasion of the inherent dignity
and worth of the potential victim. Regardless of whether an individual is
guilty of some offense, the state is not permitted to violate his fundamental
rights without abiding by certain state-created norms. The state's culpabil-
ity extends to individuals and entities within its jurisdiction, whether or not
the violation can be traced directly to it. Thus, for example, the state's fail-
ure to prevent or punish domestic violence can be seen as a human rights
violation.
In human rights literature, the victim is usually presented as a helpless
innocent who has been abused directly by the state, its agents, or pursuant
to an offensive cultural or political practice." 4 The most visible human
rights victims, those that have come to define the term, are subjected to the
now numbingly familiar set of abuses: arbitrary arrest and detention; denial
of the rights to speech, assembly, and association; involuntary exile; mass
slaughter and genocide; discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion,
gender, and political opinion; and denial of due process. 11 Consider this
descriptive report of an incident where Iraqi government soldiers randomly
selected Kurdish male villagers and executed them within earshot of their
wives, children, and relatives:
The soldiers opened fire at the line of thirty three squatting men from a
distance of about 5-10 meters .... Some men were killed immediately
by rifle fire. Others were wounded, and a few were missed altogether
.... [S]everal soldiers approached the line of slumped bodies on orders
of the lieutenant and fired additional individual rounds as a coup de
grace. The soldiers then left the execution site, without burying the
110. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE AND U.S. POLICY 52 (1996).
114. Images of the victim painted by a recent AI report on refugees are standard'fare. In addition to
the gloomy descriptions in the report, accompanying pictures show Rwandan refugees in the wild with
their worldly belongings on their heads, Afghan and Sri Lankan "boat people" arriving in Denmark, and
Sudanese youths caught between government and rebel forces fleeing on a raft. The images of despair and
defeat are overwhelming. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1997 3, 11, 17 (1997).
115. For a recent survey of human rights victims, see HUMAEN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH WoRLD REPORT 2000, supra note 70.
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bodies or otherwise touching them, according to survivors who lay
among the corpses.' 6
A basic characteristic of the victim is powerlessness, an inability for self-
defense against the state or the culture in question. The usual human rights
narrative generally describes victims as hordes of nameless, despairing, and
dispirited masses. To the extent they have a face, it is desolate and pitiful.
Many are uneducated, destitute, old and infirm, young, poorly clad, and/or
hungry. Many are peasants, the rural and urban poor, marginalized ethnic
groups and nationalities, and lower castes, whose very being is a state of di-
vorce from civilization and a large distance from modernity. Many are
women and children twice victimized because of their gender and age, 117
and sometimes the victim of the savage culture is the female gender itself.118
Another example of the images of helplessness and utter degradation of
victims comes from a report by AI, detailing the torture and abuse, includ-
ing rape, of women in detention in many states around the globe. An ac-
count from an Israeli detention center, while not unique, is particularly dis-
turbing:
Dozens of Palestinian women and children detained in the Israeli-
Occupied Territories have reportedly been sexually abused or threatened
in sexually explicit language during interrogation. Fatimah Salameh
was arrested near Nablus in July 1990. Her interrogators allegedly
threatened to rape her with a chair leg and told her they would photo-
graph her naked and show the pictures to her family. "They called me a
whore and said that a million men had slept with me," she said. Fati-
mah Salameh agreed to confess to membership in an illegal organiza-
tion and was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment. 119
The language of the human rights reports suggests the need for help--
most likely outside intervention-to overcome the conditions of
victimization. In many instances, the victims themselves deeply believe in
and openly declare their helplessness and plead for outside help. A classic
example was the case of the Kosovars who sought Western support in their
conflict with the Serbian government of Slobodan Milogevi. 120 Individual
victims serve as more vivid illustrations of this particular victim syndrome.
Tong Yi, a Chinese dissident who was jailed and freed in 1997 partly due to
116. MIDDLE EAST WATCH, THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN IN IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE DESTRUCTION OF
KOREME 46-47 (Andrew Whitley ed., 1993).
117. See AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1997, supra note 114.
118. See Salzman, supra note 95, for descriptions of the female gender as the victim.
119. AMNESTY INT'L, RAPE AND SExuAL ABUSE: TORTURE AND ILL TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN DE-
TENTION 4 (1992).
120. A recent poll of Kosovo Albanians found that 52% thought that the 1999 American-led NATO
intervention, ostensibly to create an autonomous Kosovo, was the most important event for Kosovo in
the second half of the twentieth century. NATO Intervention was the Biggest Event, Say Kosovar Albanians,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Jan. 7, 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
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the pressure exerted by HRW and the U.S. government, was profusely
grateful to Robert Bernstein, the human rights patriarch and founder of
HRW, whom she credited with her release. Despite her torturous time in
prison, Yi noted that "[ilf there's a smile on my face, it's because of Bob
Bernstein."121
The victim must also be constructed as sympathetic and innocent. Oth-
erwise it is difficult to mobilize public outrage against the victimizer. Moral
clarity about the evil of the perpetrator and the innocence of the victim is an
essential distinction for Western public opinion, for it is virtually impossible
to evoke sympathy for a victim who appears villainous, roguish, or unrecep-
tive to a liberal reconstructionist project. 22
In the case of the Kosovo Albanians, the demon was Milogevi6, the hated
autocrat who has refused to join the democratic-privatization dance cur-
rently in vogue in the former Soviet bloc. The NATO intervention may have
been more intended to oust him and replace him with a "Good Serb"'123 than
to save the Kosovars. The Kosovars and their rag-tag band of fighters were
painted as defenders of an innocent population against the cruel repression
of Milogevi6. Although Kosovars are Muslims, the press did not employ the
stigma of Islamic fundamentalism to discredit their victim status. In stark
contrast to this depiction, Chechen fighters have been portrayed as Islamic
zealots and dangerous terrorists responsible for bombings and fundamental-
ist atrocities in both Chechnya and Russia.124
The face of the prototypical victim is non-white. With the exception of
the wars and atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Northern
Ireland, the most enduring faces of human rights victims have been either
black, brown, or yellow. But even in Bosnia and Kosovo the victims were
Muslims, not Christians or "typical" white Westerners. The images of the
most serious suffering seem to be those of Africans, Asians, Arabs, or Latin
Americans. Thus, since the Second World War, the major focus of human
rights advocacy by both the United Nations and INGOs has been in the
Third World in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
121. Meryl Gordon, Freedom Fighter, NEw YORK, Nov. 16, 1998, at 42. Incidentally, Robert Bernstein
claimed the mantle of the savior without equivocation: "When you meet [a victim)... you really person-
alize it. It's not just some person being beat up. You think, She could be my daughter." Id. (emphasis in
original).
122. Other factors may, of course, enter the decision-making calculus and drive public opinion and
determine whether Western states will intervene. It is unlikely, for example, that the West would rush to
intervene in a domestic conflict involving a nuclear power such as Russia. For an example of the calculus
of intervention, see Editorial, The Intervention Debate, The DETROIT NEws, Jan. 10, 2000, at A8 (dis-
cussing the rationale for intervention in Kosovo and Rwanda).
123. For a discussion of the "Good" versus the "Bad" Serb, see Thomas Goltz, An Anti-Ethnic Diatribe,
22 WASH. Q. 113", 118-21 (1999).
124. Chechnya Reveals Western Hypocrisy, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 25, 1999, at 15.
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Rarely is the victim conceived as white.125 Due to sensationalistic report-
ing by dominant Western media organizations 126 and the instantaneous
availability of these stories worldwide, the human rights crises afflicting the
non-white world seem to be overwhelming and without number. As a result,
many affluent Westerners have in the past decade spoken of what Susan
Moeller terms "compassion fatigue,"' 27 a euphemism for a lack of interest in
the suffering of people who are seemingly remote, benighted, different in
appearance and language, and lacking in any discernibly immediate impact
on the lives of people in the West. Yet it is precisely these dire, seemingly
catastrophic situations that the human rights movement is relentlessly
committed to change.
While many victims in Latin American countries are white, the popular
perception of Latin Americans in the West is that of non-white, underdevel-
oped victims of crude despotism. Latin American whites, who form the rul-
ing elites of the region, are not perceived in the West as "typical" whites,
with the attendant benefits of modern affluence, presumed intelligence,
global power, and influence. At best, they have been constructed as "second
class" whites, lower in the racial pecking order than whites in Australia,
New Zealand, and even South Africa-the three other countries outside
Europe and North America with substantial white populations. In any case,
the typical Latin American victim is presumed to be indigenous.
The representations of the victim in human rights literature spring from a
messianic ethos in both the INGO and the United Nations. There is a colo-
nial texture to the relationship between the human rights victim and the
West. In the colonial project, for example, the colonizer justified his mission
125. This perception is often grounded in reality. Even in the United States, the typical victim of
human rights violations is more likely to be African American or Hispanic. A rare report by human
rights groups on human rights violations in the United States focused on the death penalty, immigrants'
rights, race discrimination, prison conditions, police brutality, and language rights--all areas in which
the victims predominantly are African American, Hispanic, or another non-white minority, such as Asian
Americans. Only three areas-religious liberty, freedom of expression, and sex discrimination-did not
focus on persons of color. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 68;
AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RACE, RIGHTS AND POLICE BRUTALITY, supra note 68.
For an analysis of race construction in America, see MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (1994); RONALD TAKAmi, A DIFFERENT
MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA (1993).
126. The intense media coverage of the tragic cases of Abner Louima and Amadou Diallo, two black
immigrants in New York City who were subjects of police violence, has dramatically reinforced the per-
ception of non-whites as "victims" to the American public. For examples of the media coverage of these
cases, see Helen Peterson, 600 Respond to 2nd LouimaJury Trial Call, N.Y DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4, 2000, at
12; Alan Feuer, Jury Selection Begins for Trial in Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at B3; Kevin
Flynn, Officers in Diallo Trial Want Experts to Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at B5; Kathleen Kenna,
New York Police Dogged by Cruelty Charges, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 3, 2000; Leonard Levitt, Newspapers: Keep
Dullo Court Open, NEWSDAY, Jan. 6, 2000, at A37. For a recent and detailed report on the relationship
between law enforcement agencies, the criminal justice system, and the victimization of persons of color
in the United States, see AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: RACE RIGHTS AND POLICE
BRUTALITY, supra note 68.
127. SUSAN D. MOELLER, COMPASSION FATIGUE: How THE MEDIA SELL DISEASE, FAMINE, WAR,
AND DEATH (1999).
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by drawing a distinction between the "native" and the "civilized" mind. In
one case, which was typical of the encounter between Africa and the West, a
European missionary compared what he called the "Bantu mind" to that of a
"civilized man":
It is suggested that the mere possession on the part of the Bantu of
nothing but an oral tradition of culture creates a chasm of difference be-
tween the Native 'mind' and that of civilized man, and of itself would
account for a lack of balance and proportion in the triple psychological
function of feeling, thinking and acting, implying that thinking is the
weakest of the three and that feeling is the most dominant. The Native
seeks not truth nor works, but power-the dynamical mood. 128
The view that the "native" is weak, powerless, prone to laziness, and un-
able on his own to create the conditions for his development was a recurrent
theme in Western representations of the "other." Early in the life of the or-
ganization, an International Labor Organization report concluded, for exam-
ple, that indigenous peoples could not by themselves overcome their "back-
wardness." It noted, "[It is now almost universally recognized that, left to
their own resources, indigenous peoples would have difficulty in overcoming
their inferior economic and social situation which inevitably leaves them
open for exploitation." 129 In the culture of the human rights movement,
whose center is in the West, there is a belief that human rights problems
afflict people "over there" and not people "like us." The missionary zeal to
help those who cannot help themselves is one of the logical conclusions of
this attitude.
The idea that the human rights corpus is concerned with ordering the
lives of non-European peoples has a long history in international law itself.
More recent scholarship explores this link between international law and the
imposition of European norms, values, ideas, and culture on non-European
societies and cultures. 130 Since the inception of the current international le-
gal order some five centuries ago, there have been outright challenges by
non-European cultures to the logic, substance, and purpose of international
128. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 50, at xix. Or consider, for example, the repugnant views of Lord As-
quith, an arbitrator in the dispute between the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and Petroleum Development Ltd. In
his view, Koranic law was primitive at best:
-N]o such law can reasonably be said to exist. The Sheikh administers a purely discretionary justice
with the assistance of the Koran; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive re-
gion there is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction of modern commer-
cial instruments.
Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144, 149 (1951).
129. INT'L LABOUR ORG., CONDITIONS OF LIFE AND WORK OF INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS OF LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES, FOURTH CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES MEMBERS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, Report 11 (1949).
130. See Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528 (1999); Ruth Gordon, Saving
Failed States: Sometimes a Neo-Colonialist Notion, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 903 (1997); Note, Aspiration
and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723 (1993).
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law.131 The development of human rights has only blunted, but not elimi-
nated, some of those challenges.
V. THE METAPHOR OF THE SAVIOR
The metaphor of the savior is constructed through two intertwining char-
acteristics-Eurocentric universalism and Christianity's missionary zeal.
This section examines these characteristics and the institutional, interna-
tional actors who promote liberal democracy as the antidote to human rights
abuses.
First, the savior metaphor is deeply embedded in the Enlightenment's
universalist pretensions, which constructed Europe as superior and as center
of the universe. 132 International law itself is founded on these assumptions
and premises. 133 International law has succeeded in governing "states of all
civilizations, European and non-European," 134 and it has become "universal"
although some have argued that it bears an ethnocentric fingerprint. 135
In addition to the Eurocentric focus of human rights, the metaphor of the
savior is also located in the missionary's Christian religion. Inherent to any
universalizing creed is an unyielding faith in the superiority of at least the
beliefs of the proselytizer over those of the potential convert, if not over the
person of the convert. The project of universality or proselytism seeks to
remake the "other" in the image of the converter. Christianity has a long
history of such zealotry. Both empire-building and the spread of Christen-
dom justified the means.
131. Se Christopher Weeramantry & Nathaniel Berman, The Grotius Lectures Series, 14 AM. U. INT'L.
L. REV. 1515 (1999).
132. See Antony Anghie, Francisco d Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5 Soc. & LE-
GAL STUD. 321 (1996). For example, not only does the world use the Gregorian calendar, but also time is
universally calibrated from Greenwich Mean Time. It is the "centrality" of England in the social and
political construction of the world that gave rise to designations of places as the "Middle East," "Far
East," "remote," and so on.
133. See James Thuo Garhii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT'l L. 184 (1998). See also
Nathaniel Berman, Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism? Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, and "Peaceful Change," 65
NoRDic J. INT'L L. 421 (1996).
134. S. PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (1996).
135. For a very insightful and parhbreaking discussion of the ethnocentricity of international law, see
Antony Anghle, Finding the Peripheries: Sotereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law,
40 HARV. INT'L LJ. 1 (1999). Antony Anghie writes that:
the association between international law and universality is so ingrained that pointing to this con-
nection appears tautological. And yet, the universality of international law is a relatively recent de-
velopment. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that a set of doctrines was established
as applicable to all states, whether these were in Asia, Africa, or Europe.
Id. at 1. He writes, further, that:
[t]he universalization of international law was principally a consequence of the imperial expansion
that took place towards the end of the 'long nineteenth century.' The conquest of non-European
peoples for economic and political advantage was the most prominent feature of this period, which
was termed by one eminent historian, Eric Hobsbawm, as the 'Age of Empire.'
Id. at 1-2. See also CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY, NAURU: ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP (1992).
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Crusades, inquisitions, witch burnings, Jew burnings and pogroms,
burnings of heretics and gay people, of fellow Christians and of infidels
-all in the name of the cross. It is almost as if Constantine, upon his
and his empire's conversion to Christianity in the fourth century, ut-
tered a well-fulfilled prophecy when he declared: 'In the name of this
cross we shall conquer.' The cross has played the role of weapon time
and time again in Christian history and empire building.136
In fact, the political-cultural push to universalize one's beliefs can be so
obsessive that it has been identified frequently with martyrdom in history.
[Tlhe supreme sacrifice was to die fighting under the Christian em-
peror. The supreme self-immolation was to fall in battle under the
standard of the Cross .... But by the time Christianity was ready to
meet Asia and the New World, the Cross and the sword were so
identified with one another that the sword itself was a cross. It was the
only kind of cross some conquistadores understood. 137
There is a historical continuum in this impulse to universalize Eurocen-
trism and its norms and to ratify them under the umbrella of "univer-
salism." Whether it is in the push for free markets, liberal systems of gov-
ernment, "civilized" forms of dress, or in the ubiquity of the English lan-
guage itself, at least the last five centuries can appropriately be called the
Age of Europe. These Eurocentric models have not been content to remain
at home. They intrinsically define themselves as eternal truths. Universaliza-
tion is an essential attribute of their validity. This validation comes partly
from the conquest of the "primitive" and his introduction and delivery to
"civilization."'138 For international law, Anghie has captured this impulse
clearly:
[Tihe extension and universalization of the European experience, which
is achieved by transmuting it into the major theoretical problem of the
discipline [international law], has the effect of suppressing and subor-
dinating other histories of international law and the people to whom it
has applied. Within the axiomatic framework of positivism, which de-
crees that European states are sovereign while non-European states are
not, there is only one means of relating the history of the non-European
world, and this the positivists proceed to do: it is a history of the civi-
lizing mission, the process by which peoples of Africa, Asia, the Ameri-
136. MATrHEW Fox, A Spi5UTUAITY NAMED COMPASSION AND THE HEALING OF THE GLOBAL
VLIAGE, HUMPTY DUMPTY AND Us 112 (HarperSanFrancisco 1990) (1979).
137. THOMAS MERTON, CONJECTURES OF A GUILTY BYSTANDER 87 (1966).
138. See, eg., Chris Tennant, Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal Lit-
erature from 1945-1993, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1994) (reviewing literature on indigenous peoples and
concluding, among other things, that indigenous peoples have been represented as the "other" that needs
saving by the West).
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cas, and the Pacific were finally assimilated into a European interna-
tional law.139
The impulses to conquer, colonize, save, exploit, and civilize non-
European peoples met at the intersection of commerce, politics, law, and
Christianity and evolved into the Age of Empire. As put by John Norton
Pomeroy, lands occupied by "persons who are not recognized as belonging to
the great family of states to whom international law applies" or by "savage,
barbarous tribes" belonged as of right upon discovery to the "civilized and
Christian nation. 140
The savior-colonizer psyche reflects an intriguing interplay of both Euro-
pean superiority and manifest destiny over the subject. The "othering" proj-
ect degrades although it also seeks to save. One example is the manipulative
manner in which the British took over large chunks of Africa. Lord Lugard,
the British colonialist, described in denigrating language a "treaty-making"
ceremony in which an African ruler "agreed" to "British protection." He
described this ceremony with both parties "[sleated cross-legged on a mat
opposite to each other on the ground, you should picture a savage chief in
his best turn-out, which consists probably of his weapons of war, different
chalk colourings on his face, a piece of the skin of a leopard, wild cat, sheep
or ox." 141 As put by a European missionary, the "Mission to Africa" was "the
least that we [Europeans] can do ... to strive to raise him [the African] in
the scale of mankind."142 Anghie notes that the deployment of denigrating,
demeaning language is essential to the psyche of the savior. He writes:
The violence of positivist language in relation to non-European peoples
is hard to overlook. Positivists developed an elaborate vocabulary for
denigrating these peoples, presenting them as suitable objects for con-
quest, and legitimizing the most extreme violence against them, all in
the furtherance of the civilizing mission - the discharge of the white
man's burden. 143
Human rights law continues this tradition of universalizing Eurocentric
norms by intervening in Third World cultures and societies to save them
from the traditions and beliefs that it frames as permitting or promoting
despotism and disrespect for human rights itself.
139. Anghie, Finding the Peripheries, supra note 135, at 7.
140. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIME OF PEACE 96 (Theodore
Salisbury Woolsey ed, 1886). Similarly, Edward Said has identified this European predestination in the
construction of Orientalism as the "corporate institution of dealing with the Orient--dealing with it by
making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over
it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the
Orient." EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 3 (1978).
141 See Frederick Lugard, Treaty-Making in Africa, 1 GEOGRAPHICALJ. 53, 53-54 (1893).
142 A.H. BARROW, FI=nY YEARS IN WEST AFRICA 29 (1900).
143. Anghie, Finding the Peripheries, supra note 135, at 7.
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While it is incorrect to equate colonialism with the human rights move-
ment, at least in terms of the methods of the two phenomena, it is not un-
reasonable to draw parallels between them with respect to some of their mo-
tivations and purposes. Colonialism was driven by ignoble motives while the
human rights movement was inspired by the noblest of human ideals. How-
ever, both streams of historical moment are part of a Western push to trans-
form non-European peoples. Louis Henkin celebrates the embrace of human
rights by diverse states across the globe as the triumph of the post-1945 era:
Ours is the age of rights. Human Rights is the idea of our time, the
only political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly in 1948, has been approved by virtually all
governments representing all societies. Human rights are enshrined in
the constitutions of virtually every one of today's 170 states--old states
and new; religious, secular, and atheist; Western and Eastern; demo-
cratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian; market economy, socialist, and
mixed; rich and poor, developed, developing, and less developed. Hu-
man rights is the subject of numerous international agreements, the
daily grist of the mills of international politics, and a bone of continu-
ing contention among superpowers. 144
Henkin is so quick to celebrate universality that he fails to problematize the
human rights project. Why does he not express more suspicion about the
contrasting diversity of states that have ratified human rights instruments?
Might that not mean that they are simply bowing to a false international
consensus because in some sense their statehood and belonging to the "in-
ternational community" is dependent on paying homage to international
law, to human rights? Do non-European states really have a choice of re-
jecting in any sustained manner any doctrine of international law, particu-
larly human rights, which represent the penultimate civilizing project of
international law? Why should credence be given to states here when many,
if not the majority, do not even speak for their peoples or cultures? Might
states not just be acting cynically because they want to be seen to belong
among the ranks of the "civilized?" After all, how much does the ratification
of international law instruments mean to Third World states when they live
under a patently unjust international order in which they are the subordi-
nates? Yet Henkin rejects this debate and argues that "cultural relativists"
who question the human rights corpus on ideological or cultural grounds
desire a vague, broad, and ambiguous text of human rights. 14' He ignores
these questions because they may be fatal to the project of universality,
which is essential for the human rights project.
144. HENIN, supra note 17, at ix.
145. Id. at x.
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Proponents of human rights universality claim that the antidote to illib-
eral, authoritarian, and closed societies is constitutionalism and political
democracy. The corpus proceeds from the premise that the world should be a
marketplace of ideas. The expressive rights in the basic human rights in-
struments are based on this assumption although they are subject to some
limitations. 146 But this assumption imposes on other cultures the obligation
and the requirement to compete against human rights, even though those
cultures may not be universalistic and may be ill-equipped to compete in
the marketplace of ideas. 147
Human rights are part of the cultural package of the West, complete with
an idiom of expression, a system of government, and certain basic assump-
tions about the individual and his relationship to society.148 The spread of
the liberal constitution-with its normative assumptions and the political
structures it implies-makes human rights an integral part of the Western
conception of modern society and its ubiquitous domination of the globe.
Institutionally, saviors constitute a broad range of actors and interests
which are driven by a belief in the redemption of non-liberal, usually non-
European, societies and cultures from human rights abominations. Such ac-
tors include those at the intergovernmental, governmental, and non-
governmental levels.
At the intergovernmental level, the U.N. vertical enforcement processes
and machineries act as the official guardians of the human rights corpus, and
its location at the heart of U.N. activities and purposes gives it the impri-
matur of objectivity and neutral internationalism. 149 A maze of human
rights bodies--committees and commissions-is responsible for developing,
overseeing, monitoring, and enforcing human rights. 150 Most of the U.N.
work in human rights focuses on Third World states and societies, complete
with technical assistance programs and other "hand-holding" projects to
ensure the incorporation, dissemination, and enforcement of human rights
norms, as well as the creation and nurturing of institutions to perform these
146. Cf Articles 18 and 19, UDHR, supra note 1; Articles 18 and 19, ICCPR, supra note 76.
147. Makau wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious Freedom in the African
Context, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERspEcrivE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 417, 418 (Johan
D van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996).
148. It is useful here to refer to Steiner's discussion of the connections among liberalism, constitution-
alism, and human rights. He notes that all three concepts are linked in that human rights, as it is known
today, would not be possible without liberal thought and the notion of constitutionalism. See STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 1, at 187-92, 710-12.
149. In 1993, the United Nations established the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and mandated the High Commissioner for Human Rights to be the U.N. "official with principal
responsibility fur United Nations human rights activities under the direction and authority of the Secre-
tary-General," in effect a U.N. human rights czar. G.A. Res. 141, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No.
49, Agenda Item 114(b), at para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/481141 (1994).
150. For a description of the maze of U.N. human rights bodies, see STEINER & ALSTON, supra note
1, at 362-63. See also Makau wa Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for De-
Marginalizing Enforcement, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. Rnv. 211 (1998).
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tasks.151 The United Nations is, in a sense, the grand "neutral" savior, and
Western liberal democracies treat it as such.
Although the United Nations is an institution composed of states, and
therefore is bound in theory to respect the sovereignty of all states, it has
recently taken a more active posture in human rights matters. U.N. failures
in Rwanda and Somalia, as well as the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia,
have embarrassed the world body and have made an urgent case for more
effective intervention. 152 The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 153 the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 1 4 and the 1998 adoption in Rome of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court are just several recent examples of this renewed ur-
gency in the area of human rights.1" But these actions came after long peri-
ods of resistance by major Western powers, including the United States, and
only after intense public scrutiny and media exposures of atrocities.1 56 Fol-
lowing the Yugoslav and Rwanda crises, HRW lamented the "moral vacuum
in the halls of the United Nations."1 7 It decried the U.N.'s "posture of neu-
trality between murderer and victim" and argued that the "failure of leader-
ship, eagerly abetted by the Security Council's permanent members, led to a
squandering of the United Nations' unique capacity on the global stage to
articulate fundamental human rights values and to legitimize their enforce-
ment." 15 8 The weight of responsibility placed on the United Nations in the
area of human rights is undeniable.
After the United Nations, the second powerful tier of saviors is consti-
tuted by Western states and Western or Western-controlled institutions,
including, recently, the World Bank, which is not primarily concerned with
151. Philip Alston, Appraising the United Nations Human Rights Regime, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HuMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 60, at 1.
152. See Letter Dated 99/12/15 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999). See generally UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND
RWANDA: 1993-1996 (1996); Peter Rosenblum, Dodging the Challenge, 10 HARV. HUm. RTS. J. 313
(1997) (reviewing UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA: 1993-1996 (1996)).
153. In 1993, the U.N. Security Council established on an ad hoc basis the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg,,
U.N. Doc. S/Res/808 (1993).
154. In 1994, the U.N. Security Council established the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwanda Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Viola-
tions Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between January 1, 1994 and December 31,
1994. See Report ofthe Secretaty-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Security Council Resolution 955 (1994),
U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (1995).
155. Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Confi/183/9 (1998).
156. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Introduction to 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S
GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRuaNAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, at xxi (1994). See
also Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 11 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 167 (1997).
157. HumA, RIGHTS WATCH, HumAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1995, at xiv (1994).
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human rights. 59 Western states usually employ a horizontal state-to-state
enforcement of human rights in which their foreign policies become the
conveyer belts of "civilization." Through foreign ministries, diplomatic mis-
sions, and special agencies (such as the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development and the Canadian Agency for International Develop-
ment), Western governments use a carrot-and-stick approach to force certain
policy choices on recipient states, frequently but only selectively using hu-
man rights to achieve specific policy objectives.
Human rights have featured prominently, if inconsistently, in the calculus
of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Congress mandated in 1976 that a human
rights bureau be established in the State Department and instructed that the
office report annually on the human rights conditions of all countries in the
world. 160 President Jimmy Carter gave human rights unprecedented rhetori-
cal significance in foreign policy, though President Ronald Reagan dropped
this emphasis. In 1994, the head of the human rights bureau was renamed
from the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor.161 This change seems to acknowledge the broad civilizational
sweep of human rights and their inseparability from free markets and politi-
cal democracy. In other words, the United States sees itself as promoting this
cultural package when it advocates human rights abroad.
Increasingly, the human rights movement has come to be identified
openly with the United States, whose chief executive frequently invokes
human rights when he addresses a non-European nation. 162 In fact, President
Bill Clinton's speeches on human rights have come to resemble lectures and
sermons, very much in the savior mode. 163 Today the presence of the United
States-which has succeeded France and Britain as the major global cul-
tural, military, and political power-is ubiquitous. There is virtually no
conflict or issue of importance today in which the United States does not
seek, and often play, the crucial role whether by omission or commission.
The domination of the globe exercised by European powers for the last sev-
eral centuries has been assumed by the United States. The United States is
now the major determinant of "international peace and security" and the
159. The World Bank has started to consider the linkages between human rights, governance, and
economic performance. See generally CAROLINE M. ROBB, CAN THE POOR INFLUENCE POLICY? (1998);
David Gillies, Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance: Stretching the World Bank's Policy Frontiers, in
THE WORLD BANK: LENDING ON A GLOBAL SCALE 101 (Jo Marie Griesgraber & Bernhard G. Gunter
eds., 1996); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANcE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1993).
160. The reports are called Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and catalogue violations of civil
and political rights.
161. E.g., Human Rights and Development Assistance, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(c) (1994).
162. See, e.g., Laura Myers, Clinton Talk at University Prods China on Freedom, BUFFALO NEWS, June 29,
1998, at Al.
163. See, e.g., Charles Babington, Improve Rights Record, Clinton Urges Turkey, WASH. POST, Nov. 16,
1999, at A21; Scott Peterson, Lies Still Restricted, Afghan Women See Hope, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 30, 1999, at 1.
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spokesperson for the "welfare" of humanity. Never before has one state
wielded so much power and influence over so vast a population. A global
policeman, the United States now plays the central civilizing role through
the export of markets, culture, and human rights.
European states have similar approaches in their relationships with the
Third World.'64 Former Communist states in Eastern Europe, and the for-
mer Soviet Union, whose political cultures the West deems inferior, are
treated as being in need of "civilizing. '165 Turkey, the only Muslim member
of NATO, has been denied entry into the European Union on human rights
grounds.1 66 Western European liberal democracies leave little doubt that
human rights covenants are meant for the Third World, which needs "im-
proving." Justice Higgins of the International Court of Justice, formerly the
British member of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body that
oversees the implementation of the ICCPR, notes this attitude in a revealing
passage.
As for the liberal democracies, their approach has often been that the
Covenant [ICCPR] is a splendid document-splendid, that is, for the
Third World countries and Eastern Europe, where human rights are in
urgent need of attention. Although they submit their reports (to the
HRCJ and attend to public examination, the impression is often given
that the Covenant is not really for them, because the observance of hu-
man rights is fully guaranteed in their countries.167
Finally, INGOs constitute perhaps the most important element of the
savior metaphor. Conventionally doctrinal, INGOs are the human rights
movement's foot soldiers, missionaries, and proselytizers. Their crusade is
framed in moral certainty in which "evil" and "good" are as separate as night
and day. They claim to practice law, not politics.168 Although they promote
164. See Marantis, supra note 92.
165. Although the Statute of the Council of Europe did not do so when only Western European states
were members, it now requires that all Central and Eastern European states, namely the former Commu-
nist states, ratify the European Convention on Human Rights as a condition for membership in the
Council of Europe. The Statute of the Council of Europe provides that "[e]very Member of the Council of
Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdic-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms .... Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949,
art. 3, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 106. See also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 39, at 102-03;
Leyla Boulton, Ankara Quick to Air Shift on Human Rights, FIN. TMES, Dec. 15, 1999, at 3.
166. Turkey, which historically was referred to as the "sick man of Europe," is now a candidate to join
the European Union, after centuries of fruitless attempts to become a full member of Europe. See Looking
West Europe, the United States and Turkey Have Much to Gain from Turkey's Joining the European Union, FOnT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAm, Dec. 14, 1999, at 10, available at LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Tur-
key Invited toJoin EU, With Conditions, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 1999, at A23.
167. Rosalyn Higgins, Opinion: Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee: Some Thoughts Upon Part-
ing, 1 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 570, 581 (1996).
168. See Thomas Carothers, Democracy and Human Rights: Poliey Allies or Rivals, 17 WASH. Q. 106, 109
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paradigmatic liberal values and norms, they present themselves as neutral,
universal, and unbiased. Based in the capitals of the powerful Western
states, their staffs are mostly well-educated, usually trained in the law, mid-
die-class, and white. 169 They are very different from the people they seek to
save. They are modern-day abolitionists who see themselves as cleansers,
single-handedly rooting out evil in Third World countries and cultures by
shining light where darkness reins.
INGOs have also been instrumental in the creation of national NGOs in
the Third World. Mandates of many national NGOs initially mirrored those
of INGOs. However, in the last decade, many Third World NGOs have
started to broaden their areas of concentration and go beyond the INGOs'
civil and political rights constraints. In particular, domestic Third World
NGOs are now paying more attention to economic and social rights, devel-
opment, women's rights, and the relationships between transnational corpo-
rations and human rights conditions. In spite of this incipient conceptual
independence on the part of NGOs, many remain voiceless in the corridors
of power at the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, and
in the dominant media organizations in the West.
INGOs occupy such a high moral plane in public policy discourse that
they are rarely the subject of probing critiques. Morally righteous, they are
supported by an almost universal consensus that they are the "good guys."
Even academia has been slow to reflect seriously on INGOs. INGOs and
their supporters see those who question them as naive, at best, and apolo-
gists for repressive governments and cultures, at worst. This climate of pas-
sivity has a chilling effect on human rights speech, particularly of young,
probing scholars and activists. It also encourages a herd mentality and com-
pliance with knee-jerk, governmental human rights strategies, positions, or
responses. It certainly does not encourage innovation on the part of the
movement.
INGOs also play the role of gatekeepers to powerbrokers in the West, in-
cluding powerful Western states. Significantly, national NGOs have virtu-
ally no financial independence. They rely almost exclusively on funding
from Western states, foundations, charities, development agencies, and in-
tergovernmental institutions such as the European Union. In spite of these
criticisms of INGOs, many non-Western NGOs expressed appreciation for
the work of INGOs at a retreat °70 which discussed the roles of NGOs in the
human rights movement. In fact, many sought a more involved approach by
INGOs.
The critics sought a more expanded role of INGOs and not an aban-
donment of their traditional work. No one at the retreat doubted IN-
169. See Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, supra note 5, at 613-16.
170. The retreat was composed of human rights activists associated with INGOs. It was held June 5-
10, 1989, on the island of Crete, Greece. STEINER, DIVERSE PARTNERS, supra note 6.
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GOs' contributions to the growth of the human rights movement as a
whole and to heightening consciousness about rights in general,
thereby influencing the directions and pace of change. No one doubted
the vital importance of INGOs' activities: monitoring, investigative re-
ports, publicity, education, and lobbying or interventions before na-
tional and intergovernmental bodies.' 71
The lack of a more vigorous and fundamental disagreement between na-
tional NGOs and Western INGOs may speak volumes about the leadership
of Third World human rights actors. This complacency also does not take
into account locally grown, indigenous, "non-human rights" efforts to op-
pose repression and fight for political and social change. While it is true that
INGOs often spoke and agitated for those who were politically voiceless,
especially during the Cold War, it would be a mistake to see local human
rights activists as separate from the entire human rights project. Opposing
that project would be tantamount to self-repudiation. These so-called hu-
man rights activists, local collaborators in the civilizing mission, are drawn
primarily from the elite in their own societies and aspire generally to the
political, social, and economic models of the West. Many of these activists
and their organizations are financially dependent on the West, and rely on
connections with Western institutions, including the diplomatic missions in
their countries, for their social status.
In the last decade in Africa, however, a more politically educated activist
and thinker, one who questions the human rights project more seriously and
who seeks a culturally grounded program for social change, has started to
emerge. 172 This activist and thinker understands the connections among
power relations, human rights, economic domination, and the historical re-
lationships between the West and the rest of the world. Such a thinker is
aware of the deep contradictions that mark the human rights enterprise and
seeks the construction of a different human rights movement. While this
new actor is still being defined, and constitutes but a small fraction of the
human rights movement on the African continent, he is now increasingly at
the center of innovative thinking and action. At the core of this new activ-
ism and thinking is the push for intellectual originality and self-reliance,
local and not Western foundation support, and a commitment to challenge
all sources of violations, be they local or foreign. This development repre-
sents the cultivation of a truly local human rights culture in terms of the
definition of rights and their enforcement.
171. Id., at 22.
172. Two examples of such politically educated African human rights scholars and activists are James
Thuo Gathii, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University, and Oblora
Chinedu Okafor, Assistant Professor of Law, Carleton University.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The promise that human rights holds out to the Third World is that
problems of cruel conditions of life, state instability, and other social crises
can be contained, if not substantially eliminated, through the rule of law,
grants of individual rights, and a state based on constitutionalism. Through
the metaphor of human rights and its grand narrative, the Third World is
asked to follow a particular script of history. That script places hope for the
future of the international community in liberal nationalism and democratic
internal self-determination. The impression given is that a unitary interna-
tional community is possible within this template if only the Third World
followed suit by climbing up the civilizational ladder. However, I argue that
this historical model, as now diffused through the human rights movement,
cannot respond to the needs of the Third World absent some radical re-
thinking and restructuring of the international order.
The human rights movement must abandon the SVS metaphor if there is
going to be real hope in a genuine international discourse on rights. The
relentless efforts to universalize an essentially European corpus of human
rights through Western crusades cannot succeed. Nor will demonizing those
who resist these efforts achieve a truly international approach. The critiques
of the corpus from Africans, Asians, Muslims, Hindus, and a host of critical
thinkers from around the world are the one avenue through which human
rights can be redeemed and truly universalized. This multiculturalization of
the corpus could be attempted in a number of areas: balancing between in-
dividual and group rights, giving more substance to social and economic
rights, relating rights to duties, and addressing the relationship between the
corpus and economic systems. This Article does not develop those substan-
tive critiques, but it is important that these issues be raised. Further work
must done on these questions to chart out how such a vision affects or dis-
torts non-European societies.
Ultimately, a new theory of internationalism and human rights, one that
responds to diverse cultures, must confront the inequities of the interna-
tional order. In this respect, human rights must break from the historical
continuum-expressed in the metaphor and the grand narrative of human
rights-that keeps intact the hierarchical relationships between European
and non-European populations. Nathaniel Berman is right in his prognosis
of what has to be done.
The contradictions between commitments to sovereign equality, stun-
ning political and economic imbalances, and paternalistic humanitari-
anism cannot be definitively resolved logically, doctrinally, or institu-
tionally; rather, they must be confronted in ongoing struggle in all le-
gal, political, economic, and cultural arenas. Projections of a unitary in-
ternational community, even in the guise of the inclusive U.N., or a
unified civilizational consensus, even in the guise of human rights dis-
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course, may be provisionally useful and important but cannot
indefinitely defer the need to confront these contradictions. 173
This Article has viewed the human rights text and its discourse as re-
quiring the typology of state based on constitutionalism and political de-
mocracy.174 The logic of the human rights text is that political democracy is
the only political system that can guarantee or realize the fundamental
rights it encodes. 17 ' As Henry Steiner points out, the basic human rights
texts, such as the ICCPR, "should be understood not as imposing a universal
blueprint of the myriad details of democratic government but rather as cre-
ating a minimum framework for popular participation, individual security,
and nonviolent change." 176 However, the point then is that if this were a
game or sport, its essence would have been decided, leaving those who adopt
it only the option of tweaking or revising the rules governing it without
transforming its purpose. It is in this construction that the SVS metaphor
comes to life.
Using political democracy as one medium through which the human
rights culture is conveyed, one is able to capture the imperial project at
work. First, the choice of a political ideology that is necessary for human
rights is an exclusionary act. Thus, cultures that fall outside that ideological
box immediately wear the label of the savage. To be redeemed from their
culture and history, which may be thousands of years old, a people must
then deny themselves or continue to churn out victims. The savior in this
case becomes the norms of democratic governments, however those are
transmitted or imposed on the offending cultures. Institutions and other
media-both those that purport to have a universalist warrant and those
that are the obvious instruments of a particular nation's foreign policy and
its interests-are critical to the realization of the grand script and metaphor
of human rights explored in this Article. However, the imposition of the
current dogma of human rights on non-European societies contradicts con-
ceptions of human dignity and rejects the contributions of other cultures in
efforts to create a universal corpus of human rights. Proponents of human
rights should first accept the limitations of working within the metaphor.
Then they must reject it and seek a truly universal platform.
Stepping back from the SVS rhetoric creates a new basis for calculating
human dignity and identifies ways and societal structures through which
173. Berman, supra note 133, at 478.
174. See generally, Henry J. Steiner, Do Human Rights Require a Particular Form of Democracy? in DE-
MocRAcY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM 193 (Eugene Cotran & Abdel Omar Sherif eds., 1999).
175. Steiner, for example, does not dispute that the human rights text requires a political democracy.
He argues that it in fact does impose just such a model. But he correctly points out that the model envis-
aged is not "detailed and complete." Id. at 200. The 'essential elements" of a democratic government
that the human rights instruments impose do not constitute a complete blueprint but rather "leave a
great deal open for invention, for political variation, for progressive development of the very notion of
democracy." Id.
176. Id. at 200-01.
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such dignity could be protected or enhanced. Such an approach would not
assume, ab initio, that a particular cultural practice was offensive to human
rights. It would respect cultural pluralism as a basis for finding common
universality on some issues. With regard to FGM, for instance, such an ap-
proach would first excavate the social meaning and purposes of the practice,
as well as its effects, and then investigate the conflicting positions over the
practice in that society. Rather than demonizing and finger-pointing, under
the tutelage of outsiders and their local supporters, the contending positions
would be carefully examined and compared to find ways of either modifying
or discarding the practice without making its practitioners feel shameful of
their culture and of themselves. The zealotry of the SVS approach leaves no
room for a deliberative intra-cultural dialogue and introspection.
The purpose of this Article is not to raise or validate the idea of an origi-
nal, pure, or a superior Third World society or culture. Nor is it to provide a
normative blueprint for another human rights corpus, although such a proj-
ect must be pursued with urgency. Rather, the Article is a plea for a genuine
cross-contamination of cultures to create a new multicultural human rights
corpus. The human rights movement should rethink and re-orient its hierar-
chical, binary view of the world in which the West leads the way and the
rest of the globe follows. Human rights can play a role in changing the un-
just international order and particularly the imbalances between the West
and the Third World. Still, it will not do so unless it stops working within
the SVS metaphor. Ultimately, the quest must be for the construction of a
human rights movement that wins for all.
